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Introduction
Since 1920,' Louisiana real estate brokers have been governed
by a detailed brokerage statute, today known as the Louisiana Real
Estate License Law' which, among other things, regulates their
training,' qualifications, ' and business conduct.' The statute,
however, does not purport to define comprehensively the extent or
sufficiency of the brokerage services which a broker6 must complete
in order to earn a brokerage commission.'
In the absence of complete legislative guidance, the elusive issue
of whether, under a given set of factual circumstances, a real estate
broker has earned a commission has necessarily been extensively
litigated. As a result, there has evolved a large body of fairly com-
prehensive, albeit generalized, jurisprudential "rules" which govern
the vesting of commission rights under brokerage contracts. It often
appears, however, that these "rules" are being applied inconsistently
in cases that seem to be factually similar. These apparent incon-
sistencies have resulted in a lack of certainty and predictability
1. The statutory predecessor of the current Louisiana Real Estate License Law
was Act 236 of 1920.
2. LA. R.S. 37:1431-64 (1950 & Supp. 1979).
3. LA. R.S. 37:1459-60 (1950 & Supp. 1978).
4. LA. R.S. 37:1437 & 1440 (1950 & Supp. 1979).
5. LA. R.S. 37:1449 & 1455 (1950 & Supp. 1979).
6. Unless otherwise stated, the term "broker" refers to a real estate broker.
7. At most, the Louisiana Real Estate License Law has only an incidental regula-
tory effect on whether a commission is due to a broker. See, e.g., LA. R.S. 37:1445
(1950 & Supp. 1978) (providing that a person must be licensed as a real estate broker




regarding the rights of real estate brokers, which in turn has caused
continuing excessive litigation over commission rights.
The apparent inconsistencies, however, are often reconcilable
when the underlying assumptions, hidden factors, unwritten rules,
and implied conditions which may have dictated the legal result in a
given case are exposed. Thus the confusion on the part of brokers
regarding their rights to a commission exists, not because Louisiana
does not have an extensive jurisprudential brokerage law governing
that employment relationship, but because this body of law has
never been compiled into a single, cohesive, systematic statement. It
is the purpose of this comment to expose and examine the operative
legal principles upon which brokerage commission issues are decided,
to restate the jurisprudential brokerage law as it relates to the
vesting of commission rights, and to analyze the incidental effects of
the Louisiana Real Estate License Law on the regulation of real
estate commissions.
A real estate broker is a licensed person who, for a fee, commis-
sion, or other compensation, contracts to perform brokerage ser-
vices for another in transactions dealing with real property. The
employer of a broker is sometimes loosely referred to as the
broker's "principal" and, conversely, the term "broker" is often used
synonymously with "agent."
However, it should be emphasized that although a listing agree-
ment may appear to give a broker authority to sell, it is universally
understood that it is not a contract of mandate, or agency, but is
merely an employment contract by which the broker agrees to
locate a person who is ready, willing, and able to buy or sell and
with whom the employer may do business. Absent express language
in the brokerage contract to the contrary, the broker is not regarded
generally as being clothed with the power to create a binding con-
tract or juridical act without final written approval by the
employer
8. The scope of this comment does not include an analysis of the potentially
negative effects which a broker's conduct may have on his right to commission, except
as mentioned incidentally in connection with discussions relating to the affirmative
acts required of a broker in order to earn a commission.
9. Leggio v. Realty Mart, Inc., 303 So. 2d 920, 923-24 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974)
("[A] real estate broker, absent a special agreement, has no authority to bind his prin-
cipal, or to negotiate on his behalf. The real estate broker renders a service by advert-
ising and showing properties which are for sale, and by giving advice or recommenda-
tions to his client"); Blythe v. Hall, 169 La. 1120, 126 So. 679 (1930) (holding that the
broker with whom the owner had listed property was not authorized to enter into a
contract of sale on her behalf, but merely to find a purchaser. The court distinguished
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As a general rule, the broker earns compensation only when he"
successfully procures a customer, usually a purchaser;" who is
ready, willing, and able to complete the transaction at a price and on
terms and conditions which are stipulated in the listing agreement
or which are otherwise consented to by the "principal" or
employer. 2
a broker's colloquial "agency to sell" from a true "power of attorney" stating that the
ordinary "agency to sell" given to a broker in a listing agreement is not a "power of
attorney" giving the broker the power to enter into real estate transactions in the
owner's name); Hoggatt v. John, 185 La. 227, 169 So. 69 (1936) (authority to lease given
to a broker is not an actual power of attorney to lease for the principal, but merely
means that the broker has authority to bring prospective lessees to the principal for
approval); Trentman Co. v. Brown, 176 La. 854, 864, 147 So. 14, 17 (1933) ("Plaintiffs
are real estate brokers and had written authority from the owners of the lots of a sub-
division to 'sell said lots . . . .' But they were not authorized to execute deeds ....
Paragraph 7 of the contract provides that: 'The owner agrees to execute all deeds by
warranty deed .... and hereby authorizes the agents to execute for him contracts of
sale on terms as provided . . . .' This contract conferred upon these [selling agents the]
power and authority to sell the property in the sense only that they were to find pur-
chasers and make sales contracts with them . . .. the deeds to be executed by the
owner .... This written instrument is a power of attorney to sell real estate [only] in
the sense the term 'to sell' is ordinarily used in real estate broking contracts"); Tomlinson
v. Allen, 152 La. 41, 46. 92 So. 727, 729 (1922) ("[Tlhe power to sell must be express and
special.... The listing of the property with the broker for sale . . . conferred no such
power." The court held that the broker was authorized only to find a purchaser, not to
bind the principal to sell, especially where a right was reserved to sell through other
agents or directly through the principal himself).
Note, however, that Louisiana courts continue to refer loosely to the broker-seller
relationship as one of agency. See, e.g., Saturn Realty, Inc. v. Muller, 196 So. 2d 321,
323 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967) (court granted recovery of a brokerage commission under
the rationale that "the principal shall not be permitted to enrich himself at the ex-
pense of the agent").
10. Except with reference to actual cases, brokers in general will be referred to in
the masculine gender, for the sake of convenience.
11. There are numerous varieties of transactions for which a broker may be em-
ployed. The emphasis in this comment, however, is placed on sale transactions, the
most common type, unless otherwise indicated. The use of sale transactions, however,
is merely exemplary, and the brokerage rules which apply to sale transactions apply
by analogy to other types of real estate transactions, unless otherwise indicated.
12. Lambert v. Brucker, 330 So. 2d 640 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976) (court denied
quantum meruit where the broker had not earned a commission); Pumilia v. Dileo, 169
So. 2d 581 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964) (brokerage commission is earned only upon the hap-
pening of a contractually defined contingency, ie., the successful performance of the
intended brokerage services. Anything less does not give the broker a right to a com-
mission. There can be no quantum meruit recovery on brokerage contracts); Oldham v.
Jones, 136 So. 2d 310 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961) (if an express contract exists, it is the
sole basis on which a broker may claim a commission. There is no quantum meruit
recovery in brokerage contracts). But see Gauquin, Inc. v. Spring, 316 So. 2d 858 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1975) (quantum meruit was granted despite the fact that a brokerage con-
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A listing agreement, or brokerage contract, for the sale of real
estate is one in which a broker is employed to locate prospective
purchasers for one or more designated parcels of real property. A
broker who is so authorized is given the opportunity to earn a
brokerage commission by successfully procuring such a prospect.
Listing agreements of real estate brokers generally follow one of
three basic forms: open listing, exclusive agency, or exclusive right
to sell. In an open listing, the broker is given the opportunity to find
a purchaser, but the owner (employer) retains the right to sell his
property himself, either directly or through another broker. Under
an open listing, a broker earns a commission only if he proves that
he was actually the procuring cause of the transaction; i.e., that the
sale was a result of brokerage services personally performed by
him.
An exclusive agency listing is one in which the property owner
employs only one broker, exclusively. Should another broker be the
procuring cause of the transaction, the one possessing the exclusive
agency is also entitled to collect a commission, regardless of
whether or not he actually was the procuring cause of the transac-
tion. Such a broker would be entitled to compensation, except in the
case of a sale made directly through the owner himself.
An exclusive right to sell employs one broker to the exclusion of
all others, including the owner himself. In all cases in which the
broker's listing is an exclusive right to sell, the broker earns a com-
mission whether or not his efforts actually contributed to the sale.
In such cases, the broker is "deemed" to be the procuring cause of
any transaction that takes place.
The basic difference between the various types of listing
agreements is the degree of protection afforded a broker when the
transaction is consummated through the efforts of someone other
tract did exist under which the broker had not performed sufficiently to entitle him to
a commission). Gauquin, Inc. v. Spring, however, was a case of "hard facts." The
broker had served for 39 months supervising improvements being made on a tract of
land belonging to the principal in order to sub-divide the property, with expectations
of being remunerated through earning commissions on each of the sub-divided lots as
they were sold. As a result of a heart attack, the broker was unable to complete his
service, although the work of sub-dividing the property was 80-90% complete. Despite
the fact that the broker had not even begun to procure purchasers for the lots, the
court awarded $19,000.00 in quantummeruit "for valuable services rendered," under
the rationale that "it cannot fairly and reasonably be said that plaintiff wasn't to
receive some remuneration." See also Sugar Field Oil Co., Inc. v. Carter, 214 La. 586,
38 So. 2d 249 (1948) (the court granted quantum meruit in a sum equivalent to 5% of
the consideration paid to the principal for an option privilege which was never exer-
cised, where the option payments alone totalled $75,000.00).
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than the broker himself during the primary term"8  of the
agreement. I"
An open listing, being non-exclusive in nature, provides the least
protection for a broker, since an open listing allows him a commis-
sion only if he can prove that his efforts (or the services of someone
acting on his behalf) resulted in achieving the principal's objective,
ie., the sale of the property. In an open listing15 the broker always
must prove that he was the procuring cause of the transaction.
An exclusive agency listing"6 protects the broker's right to a
commission if a sale is made through some other broker within the
primary term of the brokerage contract, but denies recovery of a
commission if a sale is consummated directly through the principal
himself independently of any broker. Thus, in claiming a commission
due as a result of the sale of the principal's property under an ex-
clusive agency listing, a broker must prove that his efforts were the
procuring cause of a sale only if the principal has concluded the sale
directly or if the sale was consummated after the expiration of the
primary term of the brokerage contract.17 Under an exclusive
agency listing, if the sale was completed through anyone other than
the principal and within the primary term of the listing agreement,
the broker is deemed to be the procuring cause of the sale.
An exclusive right to sell, which is also known as an exclusive
listing, furnishes the greatest possible protection to the broker.
Under an exclusive listing, a broker is deemed to be the procuring
13. "Primary term" refers to the stipulated term agreed to by the principal and
the broker, after which the brokerage contract or listing agreement will expire auto-
matically.
14. Any ambiguity or doubt as to what type of brokerage agreement was contem-
plated by the parties will generally be construed against the broker who authored it.
Williams v. Bel, 339 So. 2d 748 (La. 1976); Denis, Danziger & Tessier v. Tilton, 120 La.
226, 45 So. 112 (1907); Cramer v. Guercio, 331 So. 2d 550 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976). In the
absence of express contractual provisions to the contrary, it is presumed that the par-
ties intended to execute a brokerage contract offering less protection to the broker,
not greater protection. See, e.g., Dickinson v. Robinson, 145 La. 438, 440, 82 So. 398,
399 (1919) (absent contract language to the contrary, a landowner, by hiring a real
estate agent, does not thereby preclude himself from selling, nor is he thereby pre-
cluded from hiring other agents to sell it); Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Cassano, 291
So. 2d 493 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974) (an exclusive listing must be proven by unequivocal
language or express negation of the owner's right to sell himself without liability for
the commission; if the brokerage contract is oral, the court will determine its character
as an issue of fact according to the credibility of testimony).
15. See, e.g., Prescott Murphy Realty, Inc. v. Ward Peters Inv., Co., Inc., 340 So.
2d 646 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976).
16. See, e.g., O'Neal v. Southland Lumber Co., Inc., 168 La. 235, 121 So. 755 (1929).
17. Even after the expiration of a brokerage contract, the court may infer the ex-
istence of an implied extension clause. See text at note 164, infra.
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cause of the transaction and is therefore entitled to a commission
without regard to the identity of the person who was the actual pro-
curing cause, in the event of any sale of the principal's property con-
summated before the expiration of the primary term of the
brokerage contract. In such a case, it is irrelevant whether the sale
took place through the efforts of another broker or whether the
owner himself sold the property. In other words, under an exclusive
listing, the issue of procuring cause becomes relevant only in cases
where the sale was completed after the expiration of the primary
term of the brokerage contract.18
Statutory Licensing Requirements
For a real estate broker to earn a commission, he must first
comply with applicable Louisiana statutory requirements. Amended
in 1978, the Louisiana Real Estate License Law 9 provides that it is
"unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly to engage in or con-
duct, or to advertise or hold himself out as engaging in or conduct-
ing the business, or acting in the capacity, of a real estate broker...
without first obtaining a license." 0 Under today's statute an un-
licensed broker has no right to recover compensation for the perfor-
mance of brokerage services."1 At common law a broker need not
have a license at the time he entered into his contract of employ-
ment so long as he was duly licensed at the time the brokerage ser-
vices were actually rendered.22 In contrast, the current Louisiana
licensing statute provides that any person who even offers to per-
form brokerage services or who solicits any promise to pay compen-
sation for brokerage services without being licensed forfeits his
right to sue in state courts for collection. Even in Louisiana,
however, the issue of whether a broker is licensed becomes moot
once his right to a commission is earned. A principal may not defeat
a broker's claim for a commission on the ground that the broker's
license was suspended after the broker had already earned a vested
18. For cases defining and interpreting exclusive right to sell listings and in-
dicating the courts' general willingness to uphold and enforce such agreements, see
Trapani v. Katz, 198 So. 2d 423 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967), and authorities cited therein.
19. LA. R.S. 37:1431-64 (1950 & Supp. 1979).
20. LA. R.S. 37:1436 (1950 & Supp. 1978).
21. LA. R.S. 37:1445 (1950 & Supp. 1978):
No action or suit shall be instituted, nor recovery be had, in any court of this
state by any person for compensation for any act done or service rendered, the
doing or rendering of which is prohibited under the provisions of this Chapter ...
unless such person was duly licensed under this Chapter ... prior to the time of
offering to perform any such act or service or procuring any promise to contract
for the payment of compensation for any such . . .act or service.
22. 12 C.J.S. Brokers § 67 (1938).
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right to a commission, because, in such a case, he has the right to
collect a commission as long as he was licensed at both the time the
brokerage agreement was made and during the performance of his
services." Because of the importance of licensing, it is necessary to
know what is included in the statutory and jurisprudential defini-
tions of "broker," "real estate," and "brokerage services."
Definition of "Broker"
Revised Statutes 37:1431 provides that the definition of "real
estate broker" includes:
any person, partnership," association, or corporation, 5 foreign or
domestic, who for another . . . and . . . for a fee, commission or
other valuable consideration, . . . (a) Sells, exchanges, purchases,
rents or leases or negotiates the sale, exchange, purchase, rental
or leasing of real estate, (b) Offers or attempts or agrees to
negotiate the sale, exchange, purchase, rental or leasing of real
estate, (c) Lists or offers or attempts or agrees to list, or auc-
tions, or offers or attempts or agrees to auction, any real estate,
or the improvement thereon, (d) Buys or offers to buy, sells or
offers to sell, or otherwise deals in options on real estate or the
improvements thereon, (e) Advertises or holds himself ... out as
engaged in the business of selling, exchanging, purchasing, rent-
ing, or leasing real estate, (f) Assists or directs in the procuring
of prospects or the negotiations or closing of any transaction,
other than mortgage financing, which results or is calculated to
result in the sale, exchange, leasing, or renting of any real
estate, other than a provider of information, ideas, and materials
to guide homeowners in the sale of their own property, (g) Is
employed by or on behalf of the owner of lots" . . . to sell such
23. Wendel v. Dixon Real Estate Co., Inc., 232 So. 2d 791 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970);
Wood v. Morgan Bros., 135 So. 2d 692 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
24. As to whether a licensed partner in an unlicensed partnership can collect a
commission, see Fort Orange Co. v. O'Neal, 189 So. 685 (Fla. 1939) (only if the plaintiff
does not intend to share his commission with the partnership). As to whether an
unlicensed partner in a licensed partnership may collect a commission, see Lee v.
Moseley, 149 S.E. 808 (Ga. App. 2d Div. 1929) (commission denied). But see E. M.
Glynn, Inc. v. Duplantis, 250 La. 381, 196 So. 2d 47 (1967) (as long as the close corpora-
tion was licensed, the sole shareholder need not be).
25. E. M. Glynn, Inc. v. Duplantis, 250 La. 381, 196 So. 2d 47 (1967).
26. See Trentman Co. v. Brown, 176 La. 854, 147 So. 14 (1933) (license required
even if broker works only for one principal). Under the literal interpretation of R.S.
37:1431(2)(g) salaried employees of sub-dividers or other employers in the real estate
business, whose services are utilized to aid the employer in the sale of real property,
are now classified as "brokers" under the licensing statute.
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real estate, or any parts thereof, .... and who sells, exchanges,
offers, attempts, or agrees to negotiate the sale or exchange of
any such lot .... (or) (h) Is engaged in the business of charging...
a fee in connection with any contract whereby he undertakes
primarily to promote the sale, exchange, purchase, rental or
leasing of real estate through its listing in a publication issued
primarily for such purpose, or for referral of information con-
cerning such real estate to brokers, or both.27
By express legislative provision28 the definition of "broker" does
not include:
(1) Any person who, as owner or lessor, either individually or
through an employee or representative and not otherwise engaged
in the real estate business, performs acts of ownership with
reference to the property owned by him;' (2) an attorney at law
[rendering services] on behalf of a client which may be required
in the normal course of legal representation; (3) [a] receiver,
trustee in bankruptcy, administrator, executor, tutor, or civil
sheriff for any parish of this state; or (4) [a] trustee selling under
a deed of trust ....
The above categories of persons, therefore, need not be licensed
in order to collect a brokerage fee. Under the jurisprudence which
interpreted the licensing statute before its 1978 amendment, an
unlicensed person, not engaged in the real estate business,30 secur-
ing a purchaser in one isolated instance, was not a "broker" within
the definition of the act and hence was eligible to recover a commis-
sion.31
It is still true that, in all cases, a person who has even a "partial
vocation" in the real estate business is required to be licensed.
32
27. LA. R.S. 37:1431(2) (1950 & Supp. 1979).
28. LA. R.S. 37:1438 (1950 & Supp. 1979) (emphasis added).
29. See Buras v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 197 La. 378, 1 So. 2d 552
(1941) (commission denied to an unlicensed owner who sold his own property, when the
owner was in the business of sub-dividing property).
30. The term "real estate business" is broader than the term "brokerage busi-
ness" and therefore would include acts beyond those described in the statutory defini-
tion of "broker."
31. Sheppard v. Hulseberg, 171 La. 659, 131 So. 840 (1930).
32. Sellers v. Evans, 207 So. 2d 841 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1968) (commission denied
because of evidence that the broker had a "partial vocation" in the real estate busi-
ness, including evidence that, in addition to the broker's having sold several lots of his
own, he previously had investigated the possibility of selling, to an earlier prospect
with the intent to collect a fee, the same property for which he was currently claiming
a fee). See Maniscalco v. Glass, 163 So. 2d 438 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964) (it is no defense
that one engages in a non-real estate occupation simultaneously and concurrently with
engagement in the real estate business).
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However, in 1978, the Louisiana Real Estate License Law was
extensively amended and now provides that "[tihe commission of
[even] a single such [brokerage] act by a person required to be
licensed ...and not so licensed shall constitute a violation ....",
Thus, there is no longer a valid "isolated transaction exception" ex-
cept insofar as an unlicensed person, "not otherwise engaged in the
real estate business, performs acts of ownership with reference to
property owned by him . . . ." When a broker deals with real estate
owned by a third party, the "isolated transaction" exception to the
licensure requirement no longer is available.
Definition of "Real Estate"
One who performs brokerage services must be licensed only if
the transaction is one dealing with a sale, exchange, purchase, ren-
tal, lease, auction, offer, listing, option, advertisement, or promotion
of "real estate." The applicable statute includes in its definition of
real estate "condominiums and leaseholds, as well as any other in-
terest in land.""6 Therefore, presumably the sale of a condominium
or a (preexisting) leasehold interest by a broker would require a
license under the statute."6 The statute also provides that the defini-
tion of "real estate" includes real estate situated in this state or
elsewhere." The statutory definition of real estate expressly ex-
cludes oil, gas, and other minerals, and, therefore, no license is re-
quired of agents who sell or negotiate mineral leases. 8 Likewise, a
Louisiana court has held that the licensing statute is not applicable
to contracts to extract gravel or to the negotiation of gravel leases. 9
Although Louisiana courts at one time held that no license was re-
quired for negotiating transactions dealing with timber estates,"
nevertheless the current jurisprudence includes timber within the
33. LA. R.S. 37:1436 (1950 & Supp. 1978).
34. LA. R.S. 37:1438(1) (1950 & Supp. 1979).
35. LA. R.S. 37:1431(5) (1950 & Supp. 1979).
36. In Stanford v. Bischoff, 159 La. 892, 106 So. 371 (1925) (apparently statutorily
overruled by R.S. 37:1431(5)), the court, on rehearing, held that the statute was in-
applicable to the sale or purchase or pre-existing real estate leases, as opposed to the
original negotiation of such leases.
37. LA. R.S. 37:1431(5) (1950 & Supp. 1979). See Moore v. Burdine, 174 So. 279 (La.
App. Orl. Cir. 1937) (A broker negotiated the sale of real estate located in Mississippi.
The contract to buy was executed in Mississippi, but the prospects were domiciled in
Louisiana. The court therefore held that the broker must comply with the Louisiana
License Law; therefore, since the broker was not licensed as a Louisiana broker, his
claim for commission was denied).
38. Vander Sluys v. Finfrock, 158 La. 175, 103 So. 730 (1925).
39. Gonzales v. Watson, 162 La. 1048, 111 So. 416 (1927).
40. Cleaton v. Dowling, 164 La. 46, 113 So. 759 (1927).
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definition of real estate and thus requires timber brokers to be
licensed.'1 The licensing requirement has been held inapplicable to
brokerage services relating to construction contracts;'2 however,
there is a sharp distinction between a true building contract, ie., a
construction or improvement made upon land belonging to another,
and a contract of sale of real estate and improvements owned by a
building contractor. A claim by an unlicensed person for compensa-
tion will be denied in the latter case, regardless of whether the
claim is disguised as an "incentive payment,"'3 salary due," or other
denomination.
The Louisiana appellate courts have never been faced with the
issue of whether the sale of a cemetery plot is the sale of "real
estate," thus requiring a license. Although some jurisdictions have
required licensure,' 5 it is submitted that the Louisiana Real Estate
License Law probably does not apply to the sale of cemetery plots.
This view seems warranted because the state legislature has passed
special legislation regulating the sale of cemetery plots.4' Therefore,
under traditional rules of legislative interpretation, these par-
ticularized provisions would supersede the broader legislation on
real estate in general.
In common law jurisdictions, whether the sale of a business
whose assets include real estate constitutes the sale of "real estate"
so as to require that the negotiating agent(s) be licensed may de-
pend upon whether the sale of real estate is only "incidental" to the
sale of the business 7 or upon whether the sale of real estate is
divisible from the sale of the business as a whole. 8 No Louisiana ap-
pellate court has yet addressed this issue, but presumably the
41. Ranger Land Co., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 224 La. 153, 68 So. 2d 907
(1953).
42. Upton v. McDowell, 307 So. 2d 146 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974).
43. Parr v. Asaff, 322 So. 2d 313 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1975) (commission denied to a
non-licensed employee of a building contractor who has located purchasers for the sale
of speculation homes which had been built by the contractor; the court drew an
analogy between the "incentive" payments, allegedly due to the employee, and com-
missions earned by brokers who perform similar services).
44. Under the literal language of R.S. 37:1431(2)(g) anyone who "[is employed by ...
[an] owner of lots ... at a stated salary ... who sells ... such lotls]" is a broker within
the statutory definition of that term.
45. See, e.g., Sockel v. Degel Yehudo Cemetery Corp., 268 App. Div. 207, 49
N.Y.S.2d 176 (1944).
46. See LA. R.S. 8:1-903 (1950 & Supp. 1974).
47. Schindler v. Florida Real Estate Comm'n, 144 So. 2d 862 (Fla. App. 3d Dist.
1962) (no license is required for the sale of a business as long as the sale of real estate
is only incidental to the sale of the business).
48. See, e.g., Moreland v. Kilgore, 83 Ga. App. 606, 64 S.E.2d 295 (1951) (divisible).
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owner of a non-real estate business would be exempted from the
licensure requirement under Louisiana Revised Statutes 37:1438(1).19
Definition of "Brokerage Services"
The courts' interpretation of a brokerage service which would
require a license does not include services rendered to a broker.
Although only a licensed broker can sue for a commission from the
principal, 50 nevertheless, no license is required for an unlicensed
employee of the broker to collect a fee from the broker for his aid to
the broker.5 Similarly, a commission-splitting agreement is not
within the purview of the licensing requirement, and, therefore, one
need not be licensed in order to share a commission with a licensed
broker."2 No Louisiana appellate decision has yet addressed the issue
of whether a joint venture agreement for the acquisition, develop-
ment, and sale of land would be included within the category of
"brokerage" services, thus requiring licensure.3
Statutory and Jurisprudential Prerequisite of an Employment
Contract
Statutory Requirement
The Louisiana Real Estate License Law provides statutory
authority for the suspension or revocation of a broker's license if a
broker offers real estate for sale or lease without the knowledge and
consent of the owner or his authorized agent or if a broker places a
sign on any property offering it for sale or rent without the written
consent of the owner or his authorized agent.5 Suspension of a
broker's license after he has already earned a vested right to a com-
mission is not, however, a valid defense in an action for the earned
commission.55 These statutory mandates, standing alone, require the
49. See text at note 28, supra.
50. LA. R.S. 37:1445 & 1446 (1950 & Supp. 1978). See Walker v. Meyer, 167 La.
218, 119 So. 26 (1928); Bristol v. Koral, 295 So. 2d 520 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974). But see
Bennett v. Bobby J. Gauthier Contractor, Inc., 242 So. 2d 595 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970).
51. Kalmbach v. Becker, 1 La. App. 91 (2d Cir. 1925); Bosetta v. Jacobs, 1 La.
App. 277 (Orl. Cir. 1924).
52. Moore v. Henderson, 124 So. 702 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1929) (commission-splitting
agreement took the form of a promise by the broker to rebate to the owner a portion
of the commission earned by the broker).
53. See generally Annot. Joint Adventure Agreement for Acquisition, Develop-
ment, or Sale of Land as Within Provision of Statute of Frauds Governing Broker's
Agreement for Commission on Real Estate Sale, 48 A.L.R.2d 1042 (1956) (such
endeavors are generally held not to fall within the purview of the brokerage statutes).
54. LA. R.S. 37:1455(A)(10) & (11) (1950 & Supp. 1979).
55. Wendel v. Dixon Real Estate Co., 232 So. 2d 791 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970);
Wood v. Morgan Bros., 135 So. 2d 692 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
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existence of at least an implied brokerage agreement between the
principal and the broker; but these provisions provide only prospec-
tive sanctions for noncompliance, ie., forfeiture of license privileges
with a corresponding inability to earn future commissions. The
statutory mandates have no regulatory effect on commissions which
already have been earned.
Jurisprudential Requirement
Louisiana has long had a jurisprudential rule denying the right
to recover any compensation for brokerage services -whether past
or future-unless they were performed under a brokerage or listing
contract."6
Validity and Formalities
At common law, a brokerage agreement was not required to be
in writing, unless performance was not to take place within one year
or unless the broker was to be compensated by a transfer of an in-
terest in real property. 7 In contrast, a number of jurisdictions
statutorily require that all brokerage or listing agreements be in
writing; 8 Louisiana has no such legislative requirement. In Loui-
siana, brokerage contracts may be oral or written59 and, if written,
56. See Bender v. International Paint Co., 237 La. 569, 111 So. 2d 775 (1959);
Boykin v. Louisiana Petroleum Corp., 172 La. 574, 134 So. 749 (1931) (burden is on
plaintiff-broker to prove that a brokerage contract existed); Westinghouse Credit Corp.
v. Cassano, 291 So. 2d 493 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974); Johness Realty Co. v. Farm Indus.,
Inc., 160 So. 2d 350 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964); Lowenthal v. Stansell, 135 So. 2d 72 (La.
Ap. 2d Cir. 1961); Rosenthal v. Cangelosi, 164 So. 502 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1935) ("It is
settled law that before a legal charge can be made, there must be a contract of
employment, either expressly made or logically implied from the facts," quoting Jones
& Co. v. Itzkovitch, 9 Orl. App. 168, 169-70 (La. App. 1912)).
57. 12 C.J.S. Brokers § 62 (1938).
58. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-101 (1967):
No action shall be brought in any court in the following cases unless the prom-
ise or agreement upon which the action is brought, or some memorandum thereof,
is in writing and signed by the party to be charged, or by some person by him
thereunto ... lawfully authorized: . . . (7) Upon an agreement ... authorizing or
employing an agent or broker to purchase or sell real property, or mines, for com-
pensation or a commission.
See also CAL. [CIV.] CODE § 1624 (1973) ("The following contracts are invalid, unless the
same, or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing and subscribed by the party
to be charged or by .his agent: . . . (5) An agreement . . . authorizing or employing an
agent, broker, or any other person to purchase or sell real estate ....").
59. Olympic Homes, Inc. v. Ory, 207 So. 2d 258 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968); Veters v.
Krushevski, 100 So. 2d 93 (La. Atp. Orl. Cir. 1958); Isaac v. Dronet, 31 So. 2d 299 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1947); Lally v. Dossat, 31 So. 2d 41 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1947). See Whatley
v. McMillan, 152 La. 978, 94 So. 905 (1922). Whatley restated the well-established rule
that a mandate to sell immovable property must be given in writing. The court, how-
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may be orally modified"0 or extended.6 ' Even if a brokerage agree-
ment or a promise to pay a commission has been executed in
writing, the broker himself need not be a signatory to the contract, 2
nor must a written brokerage agreement describe the listed prop-
erty as fully as would be required in a contract of sale. 3 In no
respect must a brokerage contract, if written, be very detailed, 4 and
it need not state the precise rate of commission to be paid to the
broker upon performance."
In Louisiana, brokerage contracts are characterized as employ-
ment contracts, with the result that the only applicable statutory
proof requirements for such agreements are those mandated by
Louisiana Civil Code article 2277,6 i.e., they may be proved by any
competent evidence or, as in the usual case wherein the brokerage
fee exceeds $500, they must be proved by at least one credible
witness and other corroborating circumstances. 7 The plaintiff
himself may qualify as the "one credible witness," 6 and the cor-
ever, then distinguished a brokerage agreement from a mandate to sell and concluded
that a brokerage agreement is merely an employment contract which hires a broker to
procure a purchaser, with whom the principal himself will conclude the sale. Therefore,
since the brokerage contract does not give the broker the power actually to execute
the purchase agreement or the sale contract, the brokerage contract has no direct ef-
fect on the property and therefore need not be in writing.
60. Robert J. Naquin & Assoc., Inc. v. Portage Plantation, Inc., 372 So. 2d 821 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1979); Young v. Smith, 366 So. 2d 982 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978); Strahan v.
Weiland, 216 So. 2d 169 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968).
61. Foulks v. Richardson, 87 So. 2d 335 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1956) (verbal extension
of primary term of brokerage contract is valid).
62. Wolfe v. Anderson, 242 So. 2d 14 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970); Lally v. Dossat, 31
So. 2d 41 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1947) (broker need not sign the written contract, citing
Civil Code articles 1811, 1818, and 2745); Duncan Steele, Inc. v. Labatt, 130 So. 841 (La.
App. Orl. Cir. 1930) (broker need not be a party to the contract, citing Civil Code arti-
cle 2988).
63. Olympic Homes, Inc. v. Ory, 207 So. 2d 258 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968).
64.- Donlon v. Babin, 44 So. 2d 134 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1950). The Donlon contract
language stated that broker was to get "5% on gross amount of any 'deal' . . . bearing
on said property .... " Id. at 135. The court held that this language was not so unclear
as to preclude enforcement. "Deal" was interpreted by the court to include: a contract
to sell, an exchange contract, etc., but not such contracts as mortgages. The court in
this case granted recovery of the commission when, after a sale by all co-owners to the
Building and Loan Association, the property had been recovered by one of the co-
owners.
65. Lally v. Dossat, 31 So. 2d 41 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1947) (stipulated commission
rate of "4-5%" not so indefinite as to preclude enforcement. The court therefore en-
forced the contract according to the customary and prevailing rate of commission
among real estate agents).
66. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2277.
67. Dickerson v. Hughes, 370 So. 2d 1301 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979).
68. Samuels v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 342 So. 2d 661 (La. 1977).
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roboration requirement exists only for general corroboration and
not as to details. 9
Implied Brokerage Contracts
Just as a brokerage agreement need not be in writing, it also
need not be express.7° Implied contracts frequently are found on the
basis of the conduct or actions of the broker and the alleged prin-
cipal or on the basis of the principal's knowing acceptance of the
broker's volunteered services.7 A knowing acceptance or encourage-
ment of the broker's successful efforts is held to constitute an
obligation to pay a standard brokerage commission.72 In order for
the court to find that an implied brokerage contract existed, the
plaintiff-broker must prove that there was an offer of brokerage ser-
vices, acceptance of the offer or knowing consent to the performance
of the services, and knowledge on the part of the alleged principal
that the services were being rendered by the broker with an expec-
tation of payment of a commission from the defendant."3
In analyzing the various sets of factual circumstances in which
courts have found that an implied brokerage contract either did or
did not exist, it becomes evident that the operative factors which
favor a finding that an implied agreement existed include: (1) actual,
imputed, or constructive knowledge or reason to believe on the part
of the alleged principal that a broker is performing brokerage ser-
vices and expects to be compensated for his services and that (in
cases where the alleged principal is the owner of the subject prop-
erty) it is customary for the broker to look to the principal for pay-
ment; (2) active or affirmative conduct, acts, or statements (in-
cluding direct requests) on the part of an owner of property which
69. Id.
70. Doll v. Fireman's Charitable and Benevolent Ass'n, 8 So. 2d 156 (La. App. Orl.
Cir. 1942); Rosenthal v. Cangelosi, 164 So. 502 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1935).
71. See Rolston v. Buff, 130 So. 2d 732 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961).
72. See Rosenthal v. Cangelosi, 164 So. 502 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1935).
73. Harvey v. Winters, 1 La. App. 383 (Orl. Cir. 1925).
74. Adams v. Spillman, 290 So. 2d 726 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974); Olympic Homes,
Inc. v. Ory, 207 So. 2d 258 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968). See Craton v. Miller, 47 So. 342
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1950) (it is customary for the seller to pay brokerage fees unless
there is a specific agreement to the contrary); Mobley-Rosenthal, Inc. v. Weiss, 152 So.
589 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1934) (it is no defense that the alleged principal-owner of the
property-supposedly did not know that the plaintiff was a broker when it was gen-
erally known in the community that he was; also it is no defense that the owner er-
roneously thought that the broker was acting gratuitously). See also 12 C.J.S. Brokers
§ 61(b) (1938): "A sufficient . . . contractual basis for a right to compensation exists
where the owner of property lists it with a broker, or places it in his hands, for sale
... and a sale is made through his efforts."
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would acknowledge or encourage a broker to perform services on
behalf of the owner;"5 (3) actual knowledge or notice of such services,
coupled with silence or inaction;" (4) the existence of past conduct or
previous similar brokerage agreements between plaintiff and defen-
dant which would tend to indicate that a current brokerage agree-
ment exists;77 (5) the extent and value of the services rendered by
the broker and the correlative benefit accepted by an owner of prop-
erty which would make it inequitable for the owner to deny that a
brokerage contract existed;" (6) a finding by the court that the prin-
cipal subsequently ratified acts of the broker done without authority
or in excess of his authority."
On the other hand, the operative factors which militate against
finding that a brokerage contract existed between the plaintiff and
the defendant include: (1) lack of any express assumption of liability
75. Dickerson v. Hughes, 370 So. 2d 1301, 1303 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979) ("[If you
see a good prospect, send him down"); Perkins & Sons v. Laborde, 271 So. 2d 658 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1972) (implied continuation of the brokerage contract where the owner
sent the broker a map and prospectus of the property); Craton v. Inabnett, 62 So. 2d
129 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1952) (defendant requested broker's services); Rosenthal v.
Cangelosi, 164 So. 502 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1935) (no commission unless the broker's ser-
vices were rendered pursuant to the express or implied request of his principal. The
court indicated that while a contract of employment may be implied from subsequent
acts of ratification on the part of the alleged principal, in order to warrant the infer-
ence of a previous request, the owner must say or do something tending to prove that
he accepted the broker as his agent, more than merely selling to the agent's prospect).
76. A. K. Roy, Inc. v. Roy, 380 So. 2d 689 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980) (knowledge that
the broker was performing services with the expectation of compensation coupled with
silence and inaction on the part of the property owner); Harvey v. Winters, 1 La. App.
383 (Orl. Cir. 1925) (acceptance of the broker's services constitute an implied brokerage
contract).
77. George E. Newell & Son v. Hensarling, 148 So. 2d 480 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963)
(the last two counter-offers had both contained provisions for a commission; therefore,
the court inferred one in the current offer); Craton v. Inabnett, 62 So. 2d 129 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1952) (defendant had paid plaintiff a commission in the past for similar (loan
brokerage) services, so the court inferred an intent to do so for the current services).
78. Kernaghan & Cordill v. Uthoff, 180 La. 791, 157 So. 595 (1934) (broker's ser-
vices greatly enhanced the value of defendant-owner's property. In contemplation of
commissions on future sales, broker had originated the idea of combining several un-
valuable pieces of property to create a sub-division. The owner accepted the broker's
services while refusing to agree to give him a listing agreement. Commission granted);
A. K. Roy, Inc. v. Roy, 380 So. 2d 689 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980) (plaintiff-broker was to
clear, fill, and sub-divide defendant's property in order to get 15% on sales. Owner
knew that the broker was performing such services and remained silent); Gauguin, Inc.
v. Spring, 316 So. 2d 858 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975).
79. The elements of ratification consist of actual knowledge of the performance of
the unauthorized act coupled with some voluntary act or declaration on the part of the
principal indicating acceptance of the broker as his agent. See Veters v. Krushevski,
100 So. 2d 93 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1958).
1981] COMMENT
for the commission on the part of an alleged principal who is a pur-
chaser or lessee, who could assume, according to the business
custom, that the property owner (i.e., the seller or lessor) would be
responsible for payment of the expected compensation;" (2) lack of
any communication or conversation between the broker and the
alleged principal;"1 (3) express refusal on the part of the alleged prin-
cipal to assume responsibility for the broker's commission in the
absence either of other acts of the owner which may be construed as
employment, or of the execution of a conditional brokerage contract
conditioned on the broker's obtaining a purchaser who will assume
responsibility for the commission.8"
Miscellaneous Requirements
Under the Louisiana jurisprudence, in order for a broker to have
a legally enforceable right to compensation, not only must a valid
brokerage agreement exist between the broker and the principal,
but the contract must have been made with reference to the specific
transaction under which the broker now claims a commission.13 In
80. Franzella Realty, Inc. v. Kolb, 152 So. 2d 837 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963) (absent
an express assumption of responsibility for payment of the commission, a lessee is not
held liable for a commission, despite the fact that the lessee allowed the broker to in-
troduce the lessee to the property which ultimately was leased directly through the
owner). See Bender v. International Paint Co., 237 La. 569, 111 So. 2d 775 (1959)
(broker was denied recovery because, although he had located warehouse facilities for
the defendant, he had done so without any agreement for commission from the defen-
dant).
81. See, e.g., Bender v. International Paint Co., 237 La. 569, 111 So. 2d 775 (1959)
(broker admitted that he had not discussed commission with either the lessor or the
lessee); Latter & Blum v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 208 La. 490, 23 So. 2d 193 (1945)
(the court found that the broker was merely trying to "get a margin" between the best
offer of vendor and vendee. The broker had misrepresented the offer that had been
made; broker told vendor only what the vendor would net and not that the sale price
included an additional sum that the broker intended to keep as his commission);
Teague v. Ashy, 278 So. 2d 516 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973) (no discussion of commission
between the broker and the alleged principal; commission denied).
82. Monsur v. Hoornstra, 95 So. 2d 656 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1957) (the mere fact that
the commission is included as part of the sale price does not establish conclusively the
vendor's liability for the brokerage commission; where the vendor specifically stipu-
lates that there is no brokerage agreement unless the purchaser assumes liability for
the commission, then the mere fact that the vendor allows the commission to be in-
cluded as part of the purchase price does not render the vendor liable for the commis-
sion if the sale is not consummated); A. Gagliano, Inc. v. Barba, 24 So. 2d 825 (La. App.
Orl. Cir. 1946).
83. Doll v. Albert Weiblen Marble & Granite Co., 207 La. 769, 22 So. 2d 59 (1945)
(the broker must have been employed to negotiate the very contract in connection
with which he rendered his services); George E. Newell & Son v. Terrytown New
Orleans Corp., 193 So. 2d 389 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966) (commission denied because,
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addition, the jurisprudence requires that the principal execute the
brokerage contract with a licensed broker, as opposed to a salesman
or associate broker who is affiliated with and sponsored by another
broker."
Heritability of Brokerage Contracts
Once a licensed broker has made a valid brokerage or listing
contract with a principal, the contract is binding on the heirs and
successors of the principal; because the brokerage agreement is an
employment contract, the obligation is heritable on the part of the
obligee. 5 However, because employment contracts are not heritable
on the part of the obligor,86 the ordinary rule would be that the
broker's listing is not heritable, and thus the broker's authority
would not extend to his heirs or legatees. The real estate license
statute, as amended in 1978,8" apparently attempts to alter this rule.
Revised Statutes 37:1451 provides:
Whenever a real estate broker dies, any duly licensed member
of the business, corporation, firm, association, or other organiza-
although a brokerage contract did exist with reference to other portions of the prop-
erty belonging to the alleged principal, the court found that no brokerage agreement
existed with reference to the defendant's west tract).
84. LA. R.S. 37:1446 (1950 & Supp. 1978) provides that "[a]ssociate brokers or
salesmen shall not accept a commission or valuable consideration for the performance
of any act herein specified from any person, except their sponsoring broker." See
Walker v. Meyer, 167 La. 218, 119 So. 26 (1928) (brokerage contract must be made with
a broker or a salesman representing a disclosed broker. It is not sufficient if a contract
is made with a salesman only or with a salesman representing an undisclosed broker.
Salesmen cannot enforce legally their own demands for commissions, nor can they
transfer their (non-existent) right to a broker for enforcement).
85. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2007. See Richardson v. Bradford, 153 La. 725, 727, 96 So.
546, 547 (1923) (although denying recovery of the commission because the broker never
succeeded in procuring a ready, willing, and able buyer on terms agreeable to the
seller, the court, citing Civil Code article 2745, said:
[W]e cannot agree that a [brokerage] contract . . . is governed by the law of
mandate as laid down in articles 3016 et. seq. of the Revised Civil Code .... The
plaintiff was given the exclusive right, for a period of one year, to offer real prop-
erty for sale at a fixed price of so much per acre. If the owner had lived, he could
not have revoked it during that time, after it had been accepted and the plaintiff
had commenced bona fide efforts to sell the property. Having died within the
year, his heirs were bound to perform, if the plaintiff found a purchaser able and
willing to buy under the terms of the agreement; ... as to the obligor or owner of
the property, the obligation was heritable, and did not expire with his death. It
was an employment [contract] . . .).
Cf. Dunaway Realty Co., Inc. v. Pulliam, 364 So. 2d 198 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978) (the
court refused to hold the widow of the broker's deceased principal personally liable,
where the widow had not assumed personal liability for the debts of the succession).
86. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2007.
87. 1978 La. Acts, No. 514, amending LA. R.S. 37:1431-64 (1950).
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tion or person who is associated in real estate business with the
deceased broker, may, during a period of one hundred eighty
days after the date of the death of the broker, complete, carry
out, and enforce any contracts which the deceased broker
entered into in the name of said real estate business and in the
course of said real estate business.88
Although a brokerage listing remains non-heritable, the statute's
purpose presumably was to give a deceased broker's professional
associates, who might not otherwise have any rights under the con-
tract, at least a limited right to perform under the deceased
broker's authority. However, the statute, as written, does not ap-
pear to accomplish its intended purpose.
R.S. 37:1451 apparently is inapplicable when the deceased
broker entered into the listing agreement in his own name, in-
dividually; the provision applies only when the deceased broker
entered into the listing agreement in the name of his firm, corpora-
tion, association, or organization. Yet protection is necessary only in
the former cases, not in the latter.
In cases wherein the deceased broker had contracted in the
name of his firm or organization, the individual broker's death would
not affect the contractual rights of the organization because, in such
cases, the broker contracted merely in a representative capacity.
The organization's contractual rights would not derive from the
(now deceased) representative broker's rights; instead, the organiza-
tion would itself be a party to the contract.
In fact, when a broker contracts in the name of the organization,
as the statute requires, the organization ordinarily has complete
contractual rights, and thus R.S. 37:1451 is actually a limitation on
these rights, since it reduces, as a matter of law, the term of the
listing to a maximum of 180 days from the death of the represen-
tative broker.
On the other hand, when a broker has contracted in his own
name, his firm or organization is not a primary party to the listing
contract, and, since the broker's authority is not heritable, it ceases
to exist at the time of the contracting broker's death. It is in these
cases that the deceased broker's firm or organization would require
statutory protection if its right to perform were to be maintained;
however, when the broker contracts in his own name, R.S. 37:1451
does not seem to apply.
88. LA. R.S. 37:1451 (1950 & Supp. 1978) (emphasis added).
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Consequences of Lack of an Employment Contract
In addition to denying recovery for commissions earned in the
absence of an express or implied oral or written brokerage agree-
ment, Louisiana courts also have consistently refused to grant
recovery on a quantum meruit basis. 9 If no brokerage agreement ex-
ists, not even a broker who has successfully procured a ready, will-
ing, and able purchaser can recover a commission. This is true even
if the owner has benefited from the voluntary and unsolicited ser-
vices performed by the broker. 1
Distinction Between No Agreement and an Expired or Breached
Agreement
The two most probable factual situations in which the court may
conclude that no brokerage contract existed between the broker and
the principal are, first, where no agreement ever came into ex-
istence, or, second, where a brokerage agreement had once existed,
but had been consensually modified to expire early, or had expired
according to its terms, or was actively breached92 before its con-
templated expiration. Very different legal consequences flow from
each of these possibilities. A broker who performs brokerage ser-
vices without a brokerage or listing contract has no rights what-
soever and is not legally entitled to collect compensation, regardless
of whether his services were successful or whether the property
89. Rosenthal v. Cangelosi, 164 So. 502 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1935).
90. Shannon Real Estate, Inc. v. Toll, 223 So. 2d 693 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969) (rule
applies even in cases where the broker was the procuring cause of a successful trans-
action).
91. Teague v. Ashy, 278 So. 2d 516 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973) (the benefit to the
defendant is irrelevant if there is no express or implied contract); U.S. Realty Sales of
Shreveport v. Rhodes, 34 So. 2d 523 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1948); Doll v. Fireman's
Charitable and Benevolent Ass'n, 8 So. 2d 156 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1942) (the broker is
not entitled to a commission if his services were voluntary and unsolicited by the
owner); Rosenthal v. Cangelosi, 164 So. 502 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1935) (it is settled law
that before a commission is due, there must be a contract of employment either ex-
pressly made or logically implied from the facts. Benefit or value of services alone is ir-
relevant unless accepted or consented to with knowledge).
92. The cases are legion in which it is stated as a finding of fact that "the prin-
cipal unjustifiably revoked the broker's authority" or "changed his mind." What is
usually meant is that the principal has committed an anticipatory breach of the
brokerage contract by assuring the broker that, regardless of the broker's perform-
ance, he (the principal) no longer intends to pay a commission. As discussed earlier, the
use of agency terminology technically is improper in the real estate brokerage context,
because the brokerage contract is merely an employment contract and not a true man-
date. Nevertheless, the opinions of Louisiana brokerage cases often refer to such an-
ticipatory breaches by the employer as "revocations" of the broker's "authority."
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owner was benefitted by them. 3 On the other hand, a broker who
began the performance of his duties under a brokerage agreement,
but who completed them successfully only after its expiration or an-
ticipatory breach, is entitled to a full commission if the broker's ser-
vices, begun during the term of the contract, were the proximate or
procuring cause of a sale or other transaction completed after the
expiration or anticipatory breach of the brokerage contract. 4
If both parties mutually consent to "terminate" the brokerage
contract, this is usually treated, not as a mutual rescission, but only
as an early expiration of the contract." Even if the employer com-
mits an anticipatory breach, the listing agreement is considered by
the courts as having merely expired early. The significance of this
treatment is that, as discussed above," the broker's right to a com-
mission may be protected if he was the procuring cause of a subse-
quent transaction for which his services were performed before the
breach.
Louisiana courts formerly held that if the brokerage contract
were executed for an express contractual term, and the principal
"changed his mind" or wrongfully "revoked the broker's authority"
prior to the expiration of the guaranteed term, the broker was per-
mitted to sue the principal for damages for breach of contract,
which were presumed to be a sum equivalent to the amount of the
stipulated commission. However, recent jurisprudence holds that
even if the principal commits an anticipatory breach p'rior to the ex-
piration of an express primary term, the broker's damages are not
93. See cases cited at note 56, supra.
94. See, e.g., Saturn Realty, Inc. v. Muller, 196 So. 2d 321 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967);
Womack Agencies v. Fisher, 86 So. 2d 732, 735 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1956) (commission
granted despite the fact that the contract to sell and the actual sale both took place
after the final expiration of the listing agreement's primary term, which had already
been extended an additional month. The court said: "[Tihe seller is liable to the
[broker] ...for a commission if the agent was the procuring cause and if the sale is
the direct and continuous result of negotiations entered into while the contract was in
force ...).
95. Tharpe v. Tracy, 40 So. 2d 509 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1949). The Tharpe court inter-
preted a "termination" of a brokerage contract based on mutual consent of the broker
and the principal, not as a rescission of the listing agreement, but as a modification of
the contract thereby upholding the broker's post-contractual rights which arose out of
an express extension clause. The court based its decision on the rationale that the par-
ties probably did not truly intend to "rescind" the contract and further stated that if
the parties did intend to truly rescind, abandon, abrogate, and annul the contract ab
initio, i.e., "to undo it from the beginning," then their mutual intent to do this must be
clearly and unequivocally expressed.
96. See text at note 94, supra.
97. See, e.g., Clesi v. D'Angelo, 5 La. App. 432 (Orl. Cir. 1926).
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necessarily equivalent to his contractual fee, unless he can prove
that, but for the principal's breach, he would have been successful in
procuring a ready, willing, and able customer for the principal. 8 Of
course, if the principal is in bad faith, i.e., if the principal wrongfully
revoked the broker's authority solely to escape the payment of com-
missions earned or about to be earned, the broker's right to a com-
mission will be protected if a sale or other transaction is completed
successfully.9
The Vesting of the Broker's Commission: The Broker's Procuration
of a Ready, Willing and Able Customer
Background: The Basic Rule
It is recognized by the courts of both common law jurisdictions
and Louisiana that the parties to a brokerage contract have an im-
plied understanding that the employer intends to pay the commis-
sion out of the proceeds of the completed transaction."' However,
this implied understanding gives rise to different consequences in
the various jurisdictions. The majority of common law courts look to
the point in time at which a valid and binding purchase agreement
is executed to determine whether the broker has earned a commis-
sion, under the rationale that once an enforceable executory con-
tract has been executed, it is of no consequence to the broker
whether the principal chooses to enforce it or not."°' On the other
hand, Louisiana courts refuse to impose on the broker's employer
the burden of suing for specific performance and therefore look to
the time when a perfect sale has been completed in order to deter-
mine whether a commission has been earned.' 2
98. Stevens v. Tynes, 357 So. 2d 7 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978).
99. Nickerson & Vennard v. Butcher, 125 So. 240 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1930).
100. See Boisseau v. Vallon & Jordano, Inc., 174 La. 492, 141 So. 38 (1932).
101. 12 AM. JUR. 2d Brokers § 208 (1964):
In the conventional type of brokerage contract, where the broker is entitled to
his commission when a valid contract is entered into between his customer and
principal, it has been held that the broker's right to commission cannot be
defeated by the principal's decision not to enforce the contract upon default of the
customer.
102. Munson v. Larguier, 218 La. 693, 50 So. 2d 808 (1951) (the principal bargained
to sell his property and not for a lawsuit); Boisseau v. Vallon & Jordano, Inc., 174 La.
492, 141 So. 38 (1932) (the courts interpret brokerage contracts to require voluntary
performance on the part of the customer in order to avoid absurd consequences and to
enforce the presumed intend of the parties); Southport Mill v. Friedrichs, 171 La. 786,
132 So. 346 (1931) (the court said that the owner, upon default of the purchaser, has
the option either to sue for specific performance or to sue to have the contract de-
clared forfeited); Haight and Rusha, Liquidators of Fritzpatrick-Dunn Realty Co. v.
Marrero Land & Improvement Ass'n, Ltd., 21 Orl. App. 369, 371 (La. App. 1915) ("It
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Essentially, at common law, the majority view is that a broker's
right to a commission is earned when a licensed broker, performing
services under a valid brokerage contract, proves himself to be or is
deemed to be' 3 the procuring cause of a valid and binding contract
to sell (purchase agreement) executed between the principal and a
ready, willing, and able buyer at a price and on terms conformable
to those stipulated in the listing or brokerage agreement or which
are otherwise accepted by the principal.' 4 At common law, the
critical point in time at which the court may conclude that the
broker has procured a ready, willing, and able buyer (and therefore
has earned a vested right to a commission) is the moment of the ex-
ecution of a binding contract to sell.'° Common law jurisdictions
following the majority view also recognize various exceptions to the
general rule, sometimes requiring greater duties and risk on the
part of the broker and sometimes lessening the extent of the duties
he is to perform. If, for example, under the terms of the employment
contract, a broker is hired, not "to sell" the property, buy only "to
find a purchaser" or to render another minor service, then a com-
mission may vest even without the execution of a binding contract
to sell.' 6 On the other hand, if the terms of the employment contract
expressly make the vesting of the commission contingent upon the
delivery of a deed, the transfer of title, the closing of the sale, the
payment of the purchase price, etc., then no commission is earned
until these conditions are met, regardless of the execution of a bind-
was never for a moment contemplated that the plaintiff would earn or would be enti-
tled to a brokerage commission unless and until an actual sale of the property should
be finally consummated"). See Succession of Fairchild, 3 Pelt. 545 (La. App. Orl. Cir.
1920). In Succession of Fairchild, the court held that the principal is not liable for a
commission unless the purchaser voluntarily performs on the transaction. The court's
rationale was twofold: (1) the principal is not required to resort to legal compulsion;
the court will not penalize him if he declines to sue the purchaser for specific per-
formance; and (2) litigation is uncertain, expensive, and may be ruinous, etc., so a com-
pleted sale translative of title is required and not a mere executory promise of sale
(purchase agreement).
103. Under certain types of exclusive listings, the broker receives the benefit of
any successful transaction, regardless of who was actually the procuring cause. In such
cases, it can be said that the broker is deemed to be the procuring cause of the trans-
action. See text at notes 12-13, supra.
104. 12 AM. JUR. 2d Brokers §§ 204, 206 (1964).
105. Id. at § 194; 12 C.J.S. Brokers § 84 (1938):
The right of a broker to compensation accrues on completion of negotiations
and on a meeting of the minds of the principal and the customer procured by the
broker; but, unless provided otherwise in the contract of employment, it is not
dependent on the final consummation of the transaction or the performance of the
agreement entered into between the principal and the customer.
106. 12 C.J.S. Brokers § 89 (1938).
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ing contract to sell.' 7 In cases wherein a broker would have earned
a commission but for the fact that the intended transaction was not
consummated, if the non-consummation is due to the fault of the
principal or to his refusal or inability to perform, then the right of
the broker to the commission is not defeated, and the principal is
held liable for the commission,"°8 whether or not the brokerage con-
tract would otherwise require the consummation of the
transaction."9
Louisiana courts have imposed additional implied conditions on
brokerage contracts, thus increasing the service required of a real
estate broker in order to earn a commission. The Louisiana rule is
that, generally, a broker's commission is earned only when a licensed
broker, performing services under an existing brokerage contract,
proves himself to be or is deemed to be the procuring cause of a
valid and binding contract of sale"' executed between the principal
and a ready, willing, and able buyer at a price and on terms con-
formable to those stipulated in the listing or brokerage agreement
or which otherwise are accepted by the principal. In Louisiana, the
critical point at which the broker has procured a ready, willing, and
able buyer is not at the execution of a purchase agreement, but only
at the moment of a binding contract of sale."'
The issue of whether a broker's right to a commission is
defeated when the purchaser defaults after the execution of a final
act of sale seldom has been litigated in Louisiana, most controver-
sies having arisen over the nonperformance of executory purchase
agreements." 2 It is submitted that, as a general rule, the default of a
107. 12 AM. JUR. 2d Brokers § 205 (1964):
Although generally a broker's commission is earned when a valid contract is en-
tered into between his principal and a customer procured by him, it is recognized
that under a special contract by which commissions are dependent upon some con-
dition beyond that implied by the ordinary brokerage contract, the failure or
refusal of the customer to carry out his contract may be fatal to the recovery of
commissions by the broker .... This has been the result reached in some cases
where the brokerage contract called for the payment of commissions on the com-
pletion, consummation, or closing of the transaction or sale.
108. Annot., Right of Real Estate Broker, Employed to Effect or Consummate
Sale, to Compensation Where Principal Refuses or is Unable to Complete Transaction,
169 A.L.R. 605 (1947).
109. See Annot., Real Estate Broker's Right to Commissions, Under Contract Call-
ing for Net Price or Entitling Broker to All Above a Specified Price, where Sale is
Not Completed Because of Refusal or Fault of Owner, 144 A.L.R. 921 (1943).
110. See cases cited at note 102, supra.
111. Id.
112. At common law, in the exceptional cases where specific brokerage contract
language makes the vesting of the commission contingent upon the consummation of
the sale, the majority of jurisdictions do not require the principal to sue the defaulting
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purchaser after a sale has been confected should not affect a Loui-
siana broker's right to a commission."' In such cases the broker's
right to a commission should be granted regardless of whether the
purchaser's default was the result of an arbitrary refusal to perform
or of a financial or other absolute inability to perform."' Once the
act of sale has been passed, the objective of the brokerage contract
has been achieved, and the sale is perfect without further action."5
After the sale is complete, the principal assumes the risks, inherent
in any extension of credit, of the purchaser's continuing willingness
and financial ability to pay the purchase price, unless the broker ex-
pressly has assumed these risks or unless the brokerage commission
is made contingent upon the purchaser's voluntary performance of
the credit portion of the sale price."'
purchaser for specific performance, although if the principal does engage in a success-
ful suit for specific performance, the benefits thereof inure to the broker as well as to
the principal. 12 C.J.S. Brokers § 95(b) (1938). However, if the purchaser's default is
due to his refusal to perform, as opposed to his financial inability to perform, then the
jurisdictions are in conflict as to whether or not the principal has a duty to sue the
defaulting purchaser for specific performance. Some jurisdictions do require the prin-
cipal to sue a defaulting purchaser to enforce the contract if the defaulter is solvent,
but not if the defaulter is insolvent, under the rationale that a suit for specific per-
formance in the latter cases would be useless. See Annot., Right of Real Estate
Broker to Commissions Under a Contract Providing for Payment of Commissions Out
of Purchase Price, 20 A.L.R. 289 (1922).
113. This would be especially true in cases wherein the seller expressly assumed
the rest of the purchaser's performance or wherein the seller alienated or assigned his
right to receive credit payments under the sale, as when he sells his equity on the sale
contract to a third person. See Maloney v. Aschaffenburg, 143 La. 509, 78 So. 761
(1917) (principal held liable for commission despite the purchaser's refusal to perform
under the purchase agreement, because the principal had manifested an intention to
pay the brokerage commission "in any event").
114. It is submitted that, although a broker is presumed to warrant the credit-
worthiness of a prospective purchaser so far as can be determined as of the moment of
the sale, the broker is not presumed to warrant the continuing financial ability of the
purchaser after that time, unless the broker misrepresented the prospect's financial
ability to the seller or is otherwise guilty of misconduct. The precise extent to which a
broker is deemed to warrant the credit-worthiness of the prospect, however, is beyond
the scope of this comment. Suffice it to say that a broker, at most, warrants only, accord-
ing to objectively determinable standards, that the prospect is financially "able" to
perform at the time the title passes. See generally Annot., Real-Estate Broker's Right
to Commission As Affected by Failure or Refusal of Customer (Prospect) to Comply
with Valid Contract, 74 A.L.R.2d 437 (1960).
115. In Louisiana a sale is perfected upon agreement as to the thing and the price,
regardless of performance. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 2439.
116. See Avery v. Helwick, 166 So. 507 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1936). The plaintiff in
Avery offered to negotiate the sale of defendant's freezer. The commission was to be
"whatever sum he obtained for it in excess of $1,000.00." Id. Plaintiff did procure a
buyer who purchased the freezer for $1400.00. The commission due was $400.00. Plain-
tiff received $150.00 when the sale was closed and was to receive a $50.00 commission
1981]
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Variations of the Basic Rule in Louisiana
Exceptions Implied-in-Law
Like common law jurisdictions, Louisiana recognizes various ex-
ceptions to the general rule, sometimes increasing the duties re-
quired of the broker in order to earn a commission and sometimes
decreasing those requirements. Like those in other states, Louisiana
courts grant recovery of commissions to brokers when the principal
prevents the consummation of a contract to sell or a contract of sale
through his fault, refusal, or inability to perform.'17 By preventing
the broker from earning his commission, the principal becomes liable
for it. Commissions have also been awarded in cases wherein the
'principal permitted the purchaser to withdraw from the contract,
i.e., where the principal consented to the purchaser's default,"8
unless the broker also consented to or acquiesced in the gratuitous
release of the purchaser from the contract to which he was bound." 9
The Louisiana jurisprudence interpreting brokerage contracts
also recognizes an implied extension clause, in favor of the broker,
which has the effect of extending the life of the brokerage contract
when the broker proves that he performed services (e.g., negotia-
out of the second, fourth, sixth, eighth, and tenth payments. However, the purchaser
defaulted on the contract of sale, and the seller, without consulting the broker,
foreclosed the mortgage and took back his freezer and the cancelled notes. The court
granted recovery of the commission in favor of the broker because: (1) the broker had
not guaranteed the buyer's financial ability; (2) the broker was not given an opportunity
to protect his commission before the principal took actions which affected his rights; (3)
the seller had accepted the buyer; and (4) the brokerage contract language did not
make the vesting of the commission contingent upon the principal's receipt of the
payments.
117. Farrier v. Guillory, 342 So. 2d 1167 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977); Wolfe v. Ander-
son, 242 So. 2d 14 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970); Castellon v. Nations, 230 So. 2d 675 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1970) (principal held liable for commission when he could not perform
because of defective title).
118. See, e.g., Boone v. David, 52 So. 2d 563 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1951) (principal held
liable for commission despite purchaser's default when the principal voluntarily released
the purchaser from his obligation).
119. See, e.g., Miller v. Riley, 152 So. 2d 852 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963) (the vendor,
with the knowledge, concurrence, and assistance of the realtor, released the purchaser
from the contract to sell; commission denied); Barry v. Ballard, 47 So. 2d 347 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1950). See also 12 C.J.S. Brokers § 87 (1938): "After a contract between the
principal and a customer produced by the broker has been concluded, its subsequent
modification or cancellation does not defeat or affect the right of the broker to a com-
mission, unless it is done at his request or with his consent or knowledge or ac-
quiescence." (Emphasis added). The mere fact that a broker rightfully returns a
deposit to a purchaser after the default of the principal does not defeat his claim for
damages, in the amount of his commission, from the defaulting principal. Wolfe v.
Anderson, 242 So. 2d 14 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
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tions, advertising, etc.) during the primary term of the listing agree-
ment and that such services were the procuring cause of a sale com-
pleted after the expiration of the listing agreement. 2 '
Consensual Variations
Although, it is generally presumed that the parties intend for
the basic rules enumerated above to apply, nevertheless, the con-
tracting parties may and frequently do enter into a listing agree-
ment in which one or more of the basic brokerage rules have been
modified in favor of either party.121 In order to earn a commission
under a brokerage contract, a broker usually must prove that his ef-
forts were the procuring cause of the transaction under which he
claims a commission. However, if the broker's employment contract
expressly provides that the listing is an exclusive agency or ex-
clusive right to sell, there are some situations in which the broker is
not required to prove that his efforts were the procuring cause of
the sale.'22 Furthermore, even under a listing agreement providing
for an "exclusive agency," (which ordinarily would reserve to the
principal the right to sell the property himself independently of the
broker, without liability for payment of a commission) there may
be-and frequently is-an express provision requiring the principal
to "refer all prospects to the broker." Such a special "non-
120. Sleet v. Williams, 291 So. 2d 495 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974) (even if the owner
"revokes" the listing agreement, the broker still receives a commission on any subse-
quent sale of which he was the procuring cause); Pumilia v. Dileo, 169 So. 2d 581 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1964) (services rendered during the listing agreement were held to be
the procuring cause of a lease entered into after "cancellation" of the brokerage con-
tract, so commission was granted); Johnson v. Bisso Tow Boat Co., 1 Pelt. 76 (La. App.
1918) (a broker who procures a purchaser after the time of his employment has expired
will be entitled to a commission when the owner accepts the purchaser and executes
the sale). See Gottschalk v. Jennings, 1 La. Ann. 5 (1846). The Gottschalk court
held that the general rule that the sale must be completed within the term of the
brokerage contract applies only in cases where there is no ultimate sale but not in
cases such as this where there was an eventual sale of which the broker was the pro-
curing cause. Note that under modern brokerage contracts, this exception is frequently
provided for expressly through special contractual extension clauses which define a
certain period of time, after the expiration of the primary term, during which the
broker is given the right to receive commissions on all sales concluded by the principal
for which the broker was instrumental in interesting the purchaser or for which the
broker conducted negotiations, or for which, as a result of other efforts or advertising
of the broker, the broker is deemed to be the procuring cause of the sale.
121. F. C. Williams Real Estate v. Haydel, 364 So. 2d 171 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978)
(handwritten terms in contract construed against the author); Cramer v. Guercio, 331
So. 2d 550 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976) (printed terms in contract construed against the
broker); Kuhn v. Stan A. Plauche Real Estate Co., 249 La. 85, 185 So. 2d 210 (1966)
(typewritten clause prevails over printed clauses).
122. See text at notes 12-13, supra.
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interference" clause essentially transforms an "exclusive agency"
listing into what is, in fact, an "exclusive right to sell" listing,
whereby the principal is, himself, precluded from selling. Con-
versely, the protection provided by an exclusive listing may be
modified by an express reservation by the principal of the right to
sell to certain named prospects without liability for payment of a
commission.
It should be noted that a broker is generally free to alter his
rights under a brokerage contract by entering into a commission-
splitting agreement with another broker123 or by executing a multi-
ple-listing agreement with a number of other participating brokers
to share commissions."' Louisiana courts also have enforced special
contractual provisions giving brokers a right to a commission for
services rendered short of procuring a purchaser.2 15 Similarly, con-
tractual clauses in which the principal expressly assumes the risk of
a purchaser's possible default under a purchase agreement have
been enforced.'6
Sufficiency of the Broker's Services: Basic Elements of a Claim for
Commission
Unless the listing agreement expressly modifies or reduces the
sufficiency of the required brokerage services,'27 a licensed Louisiana
broker earns his right to a commission only when, by his perform-
ance of brokerage services within the primary term of an existing
123. Note that if the other broker is "adverse" to the principal, the consent of the
principal must be obtained. See Annot., Failure of Broker to Disclose to Principal Fee-
Splitting Agreement with an Adverse Party, or An Adverse Party's Broker, as
Breach of Fiduciary Duty Barring Claim for Commission, 63 A.L.R.3d 1211 (1975).
124. See generally Annot., Validity, Construction, and Effect of Real Estate
Brokers' Multiple-Listing Agreement, 45 A.L.R.3d 190 (1972).
125. See, e.g., Neal v. Trahan, 153 La. 98, 95 So. 415 (1923). In Neal v. Trahan, the
court granted the commission to a broker who was not the procuring cause of a sale of
the principal's property, but who had sufficiently performed under the terms of the
following brokerage contract: "If I sell my lease ... I agree to pay you 10 per cent of
the sale price for the work you have done in getting up the prospectus, map, etc." 153
La. at 98, 95 So. at 415. See also Monsur v. Chaddick, 274 So. 2d 499 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1973). The broker in Monsur was hired by a landowner to "negotiate" with the State
Highway Department in anticipation of an expropriation of the principal's property.
Broker was to receive 6% of the price received for the property if the price received
was greater than $200,000.00. Since the broker was hired only to negotiate, the fact
that the final transaction was completed through another broker was held to be im-
material. The court awarded the broker 6% of the $237,794.00 sale price.
126. See, e.g., Maloney v. Aschaffenburg, 143 La. 509, 78 So. 761 (1917) (principal
held liable for commission, despite the purchaser's default on a contract to sell wherein
the principal manifested an intention to pay the broker a commission "in any event").
127. See cases cited at note 125, supra.
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listing agreement, he is proven to be or is deemed to be the procur-
ing cause of a valid and binding contract executed by the principal
and a ready, willing, and able customer at a price and on terms con-
formable to the listing agreement or otherwise consented to by the
principal. Generally, the vesting of an earned commission right
depends upon the existence of several key elements: (1) a binding
contract; (2) conformable terms; (3) a "ready," "willing," and "able"
customer; (4) performance within the time limits stipulated in the
listing agreement; and (5) satisfaction of the requirement that the
broker be the procuring cause of the sale.
A Binding Contract
In cases wherein the principal's objective is the sale of his prop-
erty, Louisiana jurisprudence usually requires that the sale of the
property actually occur. Unless a final sale is consummated, no com-
mission is earned. However, if the principal through his fault,
refusal, or inability to perform, defaults on a contract to sell or on a
purchase agreement, the brokerage commission is nevertheless due.
In order to earn a commission under these circumstances, the con-
tract to sell must be valid, enforceable, unconditional, noncontingent,
and binding on both parties. If a binding contract never comes into
existence because there is no "meeting of the minds," or if the con-
tract procured by the broker is null because of mutual error, illegal-
ity, lack of capacity or competency on the part of either party, the
presence of a purely potestative condition, or for any other reason,
then the commission is not earned.12 Likewise, if a contract does ex-
ist, but is merely a conditional agreement, no commission is due."
128. See, e.g., Office Center, Inc. v. Tanenbaum, 225 So. 2d 740 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1969) (contract to sell was declared a nullity on account of mutual error regarding the
boundaries of the property; commission denied); Smith v. Blum, 143 So. 2d 419 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1962) (court implied that in order for a contract to be binding and a com-
mission due, both parties must have full capacity and competency); Ernest A. Carrer's
Sons v. Rumore, 52 So. 2d 57 (La. App. Or. Cir. 1951) (commission denied because a
valid contract never came into existence when, in light of the purchaser's desire for
immediate possession of the property, the existence of an outstanding lease and the
failure of the seller to strike out a "subject to existing leases" clause prevented a
meeting of the minds between the parties).
129. In Boisseau v. Vallon & Jordano, Inc., 174 La. 492, 141 So. 38 (1932), the court
took notice of specific contractual language providing that the brokerage commission
"is earned upon the acceptance of this offer," 174 La. at 498, 141 So. at 40, but refused
to enforce the contract against a principal when the customer was unable to fulfill the
condition upon which the contract of exchange was made contingent. The court found
that such a result could not possibly have been contemplated by the parties; "No sane
man would obligated himself to pay a real estate agent a commission for the bare
privilege of listing his property for sale .... " 174 La. at 502, 141 So. at 41. Therefore,
at least in the absence of positive proof that the signers knew the consequences of
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The most frequent type of condition on which executory sales
agreements are made contingent is one permitting the purchaser to
withdraw from the contract if he is unable to secure adequate fi-
nancing to make the payments. 0 In addition to financing conditions,
other contingencies are frequently found in the jurisprudence, such
as offers to buy which are contingent on the purchaser's sale of his
former house,' offers to buy which are contingent on the
purchaser's obtaining certain zoning permits,3 ' or sale contracts
which are contingent upon the clearing of the purchaser's check.'33
When a sale is executed subject to a resolutory condition, the com-
mission is not earned until it becomes certain that the resolutory
condition never will occur. Louisiana jurisprudence considers a sale
with the right of redemption as a sale subject to a resolutory condi-
tion. If a sale is made subject to a right of redemption by the ven-
dor, it will nevertheless constitute a valid basis for a commission
claim if the redemption period has passed without an exercise of the
seller's right of redemption.'
signing and intended to be bound by these harsh terms, there was no common consent
to such a clause. In the absence of mutual consent, no binding contract existed and
hence no commission earned. See Rossignol v. Morgan & Jacobs, Inc., 191 La. 462, 185
So. 883 (1939) (contract was conditioned on the purchaser's obtaining a permit to
operate a cleaning business on the premises. The purchaser was unable to obtain the
necessary permit to do this, and, since the condition remained unfulfilled, no binding
contract came into existence; thus no commission was earned).
130. See, e.g., Becker v. Johnson, 350 So. 2d 1259 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977);
Boudreaux v. EliteHomes Inc., 259 So. 2d 669 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972); Freedman v.
Faia, 176 So. 2d 213 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965); Treadway v. Piazza, 156 So. 2d 328 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1963); Harvery v. Riedlinger, 17 So. 2d 60, 60 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1944)
("[Ilt is now well-settled that such a condition is not (purely) potestative but merely
suspensive"). See also Robito v. Probst, 125 So. 2d 616 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961). Usually,
the offer to purchase is made subject to the purchaser's obtaining a homestead loan of
a designated type and value. The purchaser has until the expiration of the purchase
agreement to secure the loan or remove the condition.
131. See, e.g., Boudreaux v. EliteHomes Inc., 259 So. 2d 669 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1972).
132. See, e.g., Rossignol v. Morgan & Jacobs, Inc. 191 La. 462, 185 So. 883 (1939).
133. See, e.g., Graves v. Pelican Downs, Inc., 292 So. 2d 297 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1974). Although a seemingly binding contract of sale was signed in Graves, the parties
had a mutual understanding that the contract was not to go into effect until the pur-
chaser's checks had cleared the bank (which they never did). The court found that,
since the vendor's consent to the sale contract was conditional, the contract was never
binding; no commission was earned.
134. In Sealy Realty Co. v. Brangato, 255 La. 898, 233 So. 2d 557 (1970), the
supreme court reversed the appellate decision, Sealy Realty Co. v. Brangato, 222 So.
2d 620 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969), which had held that a sale with right of redemption was




Just as conditional contracts are held insufficient to warrant
recovery of a commission, neither are earnest money contracts' 6 a
sufficient basis for a claim for commission.3 ' Similarly, a broker does
not usually earn a commission by procuring a mere option to buy
which is never exercised."' However, the Louisiana Supreme Court
on one occasion did award, on the basis of quantum meruit, five per-
cent of the consideration paid to the principal for an unexercised op-
tion when the option payments alone totalled $75,000.111
Louisiana courts appear hesitant to grant a commission in cases
wherein the completion of an intended sale is prevented by an unan-
ticipated expropriation or condemnation of the subject property."9
Such events ordinarily frustrate the purpose of the brokerage em-
ployment, for the property is no longer saleable, having been effec-
tively removed from commerce by an uninvited and unpreventable
act of the state.14 0 Of course, recovery of a commission will be
135. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2463: "But if the promise to sell has been made with the
giving of earnest, each of the contracting parties is at liberty to recede from the pro-
mise; to wit: he who has given the earnest, by forfeiting it; and he who has received it,
by returning the double."
136. Southport Mill v. Freidrichs, 171 La. 786, 132 So. 346 (1931); Jordy v. Salmen,
Brick & Lumber Co., 121 La. 457, 46 So. 572 (1908).
137. Gaspard v. Siggio, 313 So. 2d 380 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975), pointed out that
whether a given contract is properly characterized as a mere option or a binding con-
tract is a question of law to be decided by the court. See also McWilliams v. Soule, 6
Pelt. 76 (La. App. 1923) (commission denied when the option expires without being ex-
ercised, even though the owner subsequently sold the property to the former optionee.
The court held that the expiration of the option was evidence of failure and abandon-
ment of the negotiations and that the subsequent sale was not related to the earlier
option, there being no continuity between the negotiations leading to the option and
the negotiations leading to the sale).
138. Sugar Field Oil Co. v. Carter, 214 La. 586, 38 So. 2d 249 (1948).
139. See Lambert v. Brucker, 330 So. 2d 640 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976) (dicta that an
appropriation by the State does not constitute "a sale," and, therefore, no commission
is due). Even assuming arguendo that the State proceedings do constitute a "sale" of
the property, it is questionable whether the broker could be said to be the procuring
cause of the transaction. See also 12 AM. JUR. 2d Brokers § 212 (1964) where it is noted
that courts generally refuse to grant commissions for condemnations of property,
especially in circumstances wherein the land taken varies in price or acreage from the
listing agreement terms, or wherein the condemnation takes place during the sale
negotiations, or wherein the condemnation award is less than the listed price. But see
Ellermann v. Matthew, 165 So. 2d 850 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964) (principal's land was ex-
propriated by the State for highway purposes, and the court held that the broker
should receive a commission on the $16,000.00 received, regardless of whether the
transaction was a sale or an expropriation).
140. See Lambert v. Brucker, 330 So. 2d 640 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976). In Lambert,
the broker conceded that no commission was due on the appropriated property, but
sued for a commission allegedly due on the sale of the rest of the principal's property
to the State Board of Levee Commissioners. The court denied recovery of a commis-
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granted when the broker is hired for the specific purpose of negoti-
ating with the state on behalf of the principal.'
The Concept of the "Ready," "Willing," and "Able" Buyer
The phrase "ready, willing, and able" is a commonplace expres-
sion found in brokerage cases. This expression has been given the
following interpretations: "Ready" refers to a posture of present
preparedness on the part of the customer to execute the transac-
tion; "willing" refers to the purchaser's continuing desire to bind
himself in a contract on terms prescribed by the owner; "able"
refers primarily to the voluntary financial ability of the customer to
perform his obligations under the contract. "Ability" is the quality
which most concerns the courts. Being financially "able" includes not
only the ability to make the initial down payment on the contract,
but the apparent ability to complete all credit payments as well. "'
Applying the above standards, courts have held that prospects
whose financial "ability" to purchase depends upon the gratuities of
third persons who are not legally bound to furnish funds are not
"able" under the jurisprudential interpretation of that phrase. "' It
has also been held that financial "ability" does not refer to the abil-
ity of the prospect to respond in damages for nonperformance; how-
ever, a prospect is financially "able" if he is capable of legally bor-
rowing the cash to make the necessary payments.' The term "able"
has been applied not only to the financial ability of the prospect, but
also to the lack of any other impediment which prevents the
customer's performance. " '
sion on the sale of the unappropriated remainder of the principal's property, holding
that the "emergency intervention of public authority" had made it impossible for the
principal to fulfill his contractual obligation to the broker and the obligation therefore
was extinguished. The broker's claims for a commission or, alternatively, quantum
meruit, were both denied.
141. See, e.g., Monsur v. Chaddick, 274 So. 2d 499 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973) (after
learning that his property was being expropriated, the principal had hired the broker
as a safety precaution in order to avoid being "cheated" by the Highway Department).
142. Morere v. Dixon Real Estate Co., 188 So. 2d 623 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
143. See Prescott Murphy Realty, Inc. v. Ward Peters Inc., Inv. Co., 340 So. 2d 646
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1976) (if the prospect is a corporation, then the corporate entity itself
must be ready, willing, and able to perform. It is immaterial that one or more
shareholders are ready, willing, and able, when the shareholders are not bound per-
sonally to purchase the property); Morere v. Dixon Real Estate Co., 188 So. 2d 623 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1966).
144. Joiner v. Lockart, 352 So. 2d 240 (La. 1977); Joiner v. Lockart, 350 So. 2d 199
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1977).
145. See, e.g., Derbes v. Balche, 121 So. 366 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1929). In Derbes the
owner tried to sell property to himself. Since theoretically a property owner is legally
incapable of selling to himself, no commission was earned.
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In the absence of a consummated sale, Louisiana courts use the
concept of a ready, willing, and able customer to determine whether,
notwithstanding the lack of a completed sale, the broker has never-
theless earned a vested right to a commission.""6 The words "ready,"
"willing," and "able" are inconsistently employed in two different
types of situations to describe the necessary qualifications of a pros-
pect. In one context, the words are used in cases wherein the pro-
spective customer defaults on his purchase contract to describe the
requisite caliber, posture, financial standing, and capabilities of the
customer which are demanded in order for a broker to earn a com-
mission. On the other hand, the phrase "ready, willing, and able" is
used to determine whether a broker has earned a commission when,
upon the presentation of a prospect to the principal, the principal
defaults or declines to accept the prospect or to execute a purchase
agreement. Although the terms "ready," "willing," and "able" are
purportedly interchangeable without reference to differing contexts,
the courts nevertheless give these terms a different interpretation
in cases wherein the principal has rejected a prospect whose offer
conforms to the price and terms stipulated in the listing agreement
than they give in cases wherein the customer has defaulted. Ob-
viously, this differing treatment of an identical phrase is potentially
a source of great confusion, since a prospect who is "ready, willing,
and able" in one context is not necessarily "ready, willing, and able"
in the other.
Typically, when it is the customer who has defaulted on an
executory contract, the courts invariably deny recovery of a commis-
sion, under the express or implied rationale that the brokerage ser-
vices were not successfully performed, ie., that the customer pro-
cured by the broker was either not "ready" or "willing" or "able" to
perform.'47 In this situation, the terms are used to effectuate the
general rule that the broker has no right to a commission from the
principal if the customer fails to perform. Since the courts recognize
the implied intent of the parties to have the commission paid from
146. See, e.g., McGavock v. Woodlief, 61 U.S. 221 (1857) (broker earns a commission
when he finds a ready, willing, and able buyer on terms specified by the seller). See
also Morere v. Dixon Real Estate Co., 188 So. 2d 623 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966) (commis-
sion denied because, although a binding contract was entered into between the prin-
cipal and the prospective purchaser, the purchaser was not credit-worthy and was not
financially able to carry out his obligations under the agreement); Ernest A. Carrere's
Sons v. Edstrom, 119 So. 284 (La. App. Or]. Cir. 1928) (finding that the broker had
located a ready, willing, and able customer (ie., a lessee), the court granted recovery
of a commission to the broker despite the fact that, as a result of the principal's
refusal to contract, not even an executory contract had been entered).
147. Munson v. Larguier, 218 La. 693, 50 So. 2d 808 (1951); Morere v. Dixon Real
Estate Co., 188 So. 2d 623 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
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the proceeds of an executed sale, where no sale takes place because
the customer defaults, this is viewed as conclusive evidence that the
prospect was not "ready," "willing," and "able."
On the other hand, when a broker has procured a prospect who
reasonably appears to be financially and otherwise "able" and who
makes an offer (which is rejected) to the principal on terms substan-
tially conformable to the terms of the listing agreement, the courts
tend to assume that the prospect was "ready," "willing," and "able"
and thus to grant recovery of the commission.148 The apparent incon-
sistency in the use of these terms can be reconciled by an awareness
that the courts, in the latter situation, are enforcing an implied cove-
nant which exists in every listing agreement, in favor of a broker,
that the principal will accept any "ready," "willing," and "able" pros-
pect presented by the broker and will consummate the transaction
with him. 4' The principal is relieved of responsibility for payment of
the commission only if it can be shown that the prospect was not
qualified. Thus, the principal should be permitted to reject a pros-
pect if-and only if-the rejection results from the exercise of rea-
sonable discretion on the part of the principal, culminating in a good
faith, objective judgment that the prospect was not qualified.15
Conformable Terms
The principal's listing agreement with the broker contains an
implied covenant that, in exchange for the broker's services, the
principal will consummate a transaction when the broker has pro-
cured a ready, willing, and able buyer on terms and conditions sat-
isfactory to the principal."' The issue that most often arises in this
148. Ernest A. Carrere's Sons v. Edstrom, 119 So. 284 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1928).
The Edstrom court noted that the lessor-principal declined to enter into a lease con-
tract with a ready, willing, and able tenant-prospect procured by the broker. The court
held the lessor-principal liable for the commission because "the exercise of that
privilege [te., the principal's free will to refuse to consummate the lease] was burdened
with the responsibility for the compensation earned by plaintiff [broker). ... M at
285. See Tomlinson v. Allen, 152 La. 41, 45, 92 So. 727, 729 (1922) ("the prospective pur-
chaser can not complain, though it well may be that the agent, as a result, may be en-
titled to his commission").
149. Young v. Smith, 366 So. 2d 982 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978). The Young v. Smith
court granted the commission because, although the terms of the sale price, etc., in the
offer were different from those in the listing agreement, the court found that the prin-
cipal had consented to a modification of the listing terms; therefore, the vendor was in
default for refusing to accept a ready, willing, and able buyer on the modified terms.
150. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1901 & 2040; Barry v. Guiffria, 120 So. 878 (La.
App. Orl. Cir. 1929) (even if the principal has a good moral or business reason, this
does not relieve him of liability for payment of the commission if he refuses to sell for
reasons other than the qualifications of the prospect).
151. See text at note 231, infra.
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context is the question of whether the principal has a duty to con-
tract with a prospect whose offer substantially conforms with the
terms stipulated in the listing agreement, but which is not a mirror
image of the stipulated terms. The general rule is that the procure-
ment of an offer, whose terms differ materially from those stip-
ulated in the listing agreement, is not sufficient to create an obliga-
tion of the principal to accept the offer, to contract with the pros-
pect, or to pay the broker a commission,152 unless the deviation in
the offer is de minimis or beneficial to the principal.'53 The criteria
used by the courts in determining whether a principal-seller has a
right to object to a purchaser's demand that the seller pay a par-
ticular cost is embodied in the following general rules: First, if the
offer received contains conditions which, although not expressly
covered by the listing agreement, are nevertheless imposed by law
or implied by the terms of the listing contract, such an offer is not
"non-conforming." I" Second, the principal may not subsequently im-
152. Cramer v. Guercio, 331 So. 2d 550 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976) (although the
ultimate purchasers of the home had first been introduced by the original broker, he
had never succeeded in obtaining from them a conforming offer; the court held the sec-
ond broker to be the procuring cause of the transaction and not the original broker);
Lindsay Realty Corp. v. Bellina, 320 So. 2d 572 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975) (owner
stipulated that the purchase price was to be paid over a 25 year credit term, but the
purchaser demanded a prepayment clause without a penalty. Therefore, this was a
non-conforming offer, and no commission was earned); Louisiana Co. v. Bueche, 273 So.
2d 903 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973) (the difference between the listed price of $500.00 per
acre and the offered price of $300.00 per acre made the offer a non-conforming one;
thus, no commission was earned); A. Galiano, Inc. v. Barba, 24 So. 2d 825 (La. App. Orl.
Cir. 1946). In Barba the broker was authorized to sell "property and furniture" for
$12,000.00. The broker obtained an offer of $12,750.00 for the property and furniture
and the linens and pots; this was not a conforming offer, and no commission was earned.
Also, when the vendor stipulated that the vendee would pay the brokerage commis-
sion, but the offer of the vendee provided that the vendor would pay the commission,
this discrepancy defeated the broker's right to a commission.
153. Annot., What Deviation in Prospective Vendee's Proposal from Vendor's
Terms Precludes Broker from Recovering Commission for Producing a Ready, Will-
ing, and Able Vendee, 18 A.L.R.2d 376 (1951) concludes that courts most often deny
recovery of a commission when the deviation affects the (1) method or medium of pay-
ment, (2) time of payment, (3) amount of down payment, (4) insufficiency of security
where the vendor demanded security, or (5) payment of a brokerage commission. Other
types of deviations which frequently are held to constitute counter-offers the principal
has a right to reject include variations involving easements, closing costs, furnishings
and appliances, survey costs, construction of improvements, interest rates, furnishing
an abstract of title, etc. See Ernest A. Carrere's Sons v. Rumore, 52 So. 2d 57 (La.
App. Orl. Cir. 1951) (no meeting of the minds as to the time for surrender of posses-
sion).
154. See Cotter v. Figaro, 36 So. 2d 291 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1948). The Cotter court
held the principal liable for payment of the broker's commission on the basis that the
vendor was not justified in refusing to sell his property to a prospect whose offer con-
formed to the listing terms except for certain demands that the principal be responsi-
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pose conditions upon the offer that were not contemplated by the
brokerage agreement.'55
Ordinarily, if the principal knowingly and voluntarily has con-
sented to a contract which deviates from the listed terms, or has ac-
cepted a non-conforming offer to buy at less than the listed sale
price, a commission is earned.' The commission will usually be a
ratable proportion of the contracted fee.5 7
In a few cases, however, the court has rejected brokers' claims
for commissions, even when the broker was the procuring cause of
the sale, where the clear intent of the parties was that the commis-
sion was to be earned only if the sale price exceeded a minimum net
amount.' Of course, as in all contracts, good faith is required of the
principal, and therefore the broker will be entitled to a commission
if the principal's fault prevented the broker from making the sale at
ble for (1) payment of assessment charged against the property, (2) payment of existing
mortgages encumbering the property, (3) payment for Internal Revenue Stamps, and
(4) payment of pro-rata share of property taxes, all of which the purchaser, the court
held, rightfully demanded that the seller pay.
155. See Veters v. Krushevski, 100 So. 2d 93 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1958); Howell v.
Thompson, 38 So. 2d 167 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1949) (owner has no right to demand that
broker reduce his commission, once it was earned).
156. Flournoy v. Atlas Oil Co., 151 La. 222, 91 So. 714 (1922) (once owner ratifies
change in listed terms or sells to broker's prospect on terms of counter-offer, commis-
sion is earned); Foulks v. Richardson, 87 So. 2d 335 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1956) (smaller
down payment offered-and accepted by principal; thus, commission earned). See 12
C.J.S. Brokers § 86 (1938) ("The negotiation [by the broker] of a contract differing from
the one he is authorized to negotiate does not entitle a broker to a commission unless
the principal accedes to the departure from authority"); 12 AM. JUR. 2d Brokers §§
185-87 (1964) (If an offer is negotiated by the broker which is at variance with the
terms authorized by the principal, and the principal accepts the counter-offer, he is
bound for the commission; but if he refuses to accept the counter-offer, he is not
bound).
157. See, e.g., Grace Realty Co. v. Noel, 156 La. 63, 100 So. 51 (1924); Grace Realty
Co. v. Peytavin Planting Co., 156 La. 93, 100 So. 62 (1924); F. C. Williams Real Estate
v. Haydel, 364 So. 2d 171 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978); Keating v. Lachney, 216 So. 2d 906
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1968); Meyers v. Davidson, 196 So. 2d 546 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
But see Lawrence v. Bailey, 41 So. 2d 474 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1949). The Lawrence v.
Bailey court granted the full commission despite a sale at a slightly lower price.
However, the quantum of recovery was not disputed, and the difference between the
stipulated commission and a ratable proportion was less than $25.00.
158. Meyers v. Davidson, 196 So. 2d 546 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967) (court found that
the brokerage contract was only a conditional one, i.e., no commission was to be earned
unless the broker netted $32,000.00; the court placed great emphasis on the fact that it
was the broker who had solicited the brokerage contract from the principal, and not
vice versa); Glover v. Griffin, 43 So. 2d 915 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1950); Munson v.
Brouilette, 42 So. 2d 880, 880 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1949) ("$7900.00 net" and broker can
have everything above that. The principal had sold the property for $7800.00 after the
broker had "washed his hands of the deal").
COMMENT
the higher price or if the principal intentionally sold at a lower price
in order to avoid payment of a commission.5 '
In all cases 'wherein the broker's principal is the seller of the
property, the brokerage contract is presumed not to be a "minimum
net price" agreement, and courts are hesitant to construe the
brokerage contract as such.'60 But in cases in which the principal is
the purchaser, it is presumed that the purchaser does not intend to
pay a brokerage commission if he has to pay more than a certain
maximum price for the property which he is seeking to buy.' When
a purchaser hires a broker to locate suitable property for purchase,
the presumed intent of the parties is that the broker will earn his
commission by locating suitable property at a bargain price, lower
than the (maximum) price for which the purchaser believes he could
locate property himself.
Timely Performance
It is generally said that, in order to earn a commission, a broker
must completely and successfully perform the duties and services
required of him prior to the expiration of the listing agreement."2
159. J. R. Grand Agency, Inc. v. Staring, 156 La. 1094, 101 So. 723 (1924); Grace
Realty Co. v. Peytavin Planting Co., 156 La. 93, 96, 100 So. 62, 63 (1924) ("It is well-
settled that where a broker, who is employed to sell property at a given price .... has
opened negotiations with a purchaser, and the principal, without terminating the agency
or negotiations so commenced, takes into his own hands, and concludes a sale for a less
sum than the price fixed, the broker is entitled, at least, to a ratable proportion of the
agreed commission"); Howell v. Thompson, 38 So. 2d 167 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1949); Jeter
& Monroe v. Daniels, 25 So. 2d 911 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1946).
160. Burr v. Leguin, 365 So. 2d 1156 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979) (despite the fact that
the listing agreement stipulated "$44,000.00 net to owner," the court construed the
brokerage contract as giving the broker a right to 6% of whatever sale price was
agreed to by the seller, under the rationale that $44,000.00 was just a starting figure
for negotiations); Perkins & Sons v. Laborde, 271 So. 2d 658 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972)
(court ruled against allegations that the oral brokerage contract was a "minimum net
price" agreement); Womack Agencies v. Fisher, 86 So. 2d 732 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1956)
(although the listing agreement provided a sale price of $21,000.00 net to owner, the
court held that contraditory language granting the broker a right to a commission of
5% of gross sales price gave broker a right to recover a ratable proportion on a sale of
the property for less than $21,000.00).
161. See Lestrade v. Vanzini, 6 La. Ann. 399 (1851). In Lestrade v. Vanzini the
commission was denied when the principal-purchaser had contracted to pay a 2%/o
brokerage commission to the broker in return for his services in locating property for
$16,000.00 ($10,000.00 cash and $6,000.00 on years' credit). The principal ultimately pur-
chased the property for $16,000.09 in total cash. The court reasoned that "the interest
he thus lost would amount to more than the commission claimed." Id.
162. Bullis & Thomas v. Calvert, 162 La. 378, 110 So. 621 (1926); Gaspard v. Siggio,
313 So. 2d 380 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975); Lehmann v. Howard, 49 So. 2d 453 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1950); Wolf v. Casamento, 185 So. 537 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1939). The listing agree-
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However, unless the listing agreement unequivocally provides other-
wise, the above-stated rule does not apply in cases wherein there is
an eventual sale of the principal's property, after expiration of the
primary term of the listing agreement, to a prospect procured by
the broker through services performed during the brokerage con-
tract. 8'
Implied Extension Clause
A transaction which the principal has agreed to consummate
outside the time limits specified in the brokerage contract, but
which began during the contract term as a result of brokerage ser-
vices performed before the expiration of the employment relation-
ship, will not defeat the broker's right to a commission if he was the
procuring cause of the transaction or would otherwise have been en-
titled to it. 8"
Frequently, a sale of real property is made to the broker's
former prospect directly by the owner after the termination of the
listing agreement. Assuming that the broker actively solicited"8 5 the
prospect before the expiration of the listing agreement, the broker
often sues the principal to recover a commission, despite the fact
that neither a sale nor a contract to sell was executed during the
primary term of the brokerage contract. In the absence of special
contractual provisions to the contrary, the issue in these cases is not
whether the broker completed the performance of the services re-
quired of him within the term of the brokerage contract; the issue is
simply whether the broker, having begun performance within the
ment terminates at the expiration of its designated term, when expressly provided, or,
if no term is stated, at the expiration of a reasonable time. Lewis v. Manson, 132 La.
817, 61 So. 835 (1913).
163. Womack Agencies v. Fisher, 86 So. 2d 732 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1956). In Fisher,
a commission was granted when negotiations began during the primary term of the
brokerage contract, even though a contract to sell was not executed until after the
listing agreement expired. The court stated that a seller is liable for a commission if
the broker was the procuring cause and if the sale was the direct, continuous result of
negotiations begun during the contract term. The court distinguished other cases
which held that a broker must perform within the time limits of the brokerage con-
tract by noting that in none of those cases was the broker considered to be the procur-
ing cause of the transaction.
164. Even if the principal has breached the listing agreement by "revoking" the
broker's "authority," the courts treat this merely as an early expiration of the primary
term, leaving the broker with residual rights. See note 92, supra.
165. See Jenkins v. Trott, 3 La. Ann. 671 (1848) (the mere fact of the broker's hav-
ing introduced the purchaser is not sufficient in and of itself, nevertheless, if it ap-
pears that the broker's introduction was the foundation upon which negotiations pro-
ceeded, a commission is due).
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time constraints of the brokerage agreement, can be considered to
be the procuring cause of the (belated) sale. In every such case
where the broker has been found to be the procuring cause, the
commission has been granted and in every case where the broker is
found not to be the procuring cause, the commission has been
denied."' In essence, these holdings superimpose onto every broker-
age contract an implied extension clause which takes effect after the
expiration of the primary term in cases wherein the principal him-
self concludes a sale of his property to a purchaser procured by the
broker.
Express Extension Clause
Many modern listing agreements incorporate an express exten-
sion clause similar to the implied extension clause imposed by the
courts. However, an express extension clause generally offers
greater protection to the broker. Under the jurisprudentially im-
plied extension clause, a broker is protected beyond the term of his
brokerage contract only if he is actually the procuring cause of the
consummated transaction.'67 Although nothing would prohibit the in-
clusion into a brokerage contract of a limited express extension
clause to protect the broker only when he is actually the procuring
cause of a transaction completed after the brokerage agreement ex-
166. Jeter & Monroe v. Daniels, 25 So. 2d 911 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1946). Implied ex-
tension clauses were imputed in the following cases: Sleet v. Gray, 351 So. 2d 286 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1977); Pumilia v. Dileo, 169 So. 2d 581 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964); Corbitt v.
Robinson, 53 So. 2d 259 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1951); Wolf v. Casamento, 185 So. 537 (La.
App. Orl. Cir. 1939); Viguerie v. Mathes, 120 So. 542 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1929). Express
extension clauses were enforced in the following cases: Dickerson v. Hughes, 370 So.
2d 1301 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979); Garrick v. Rush, 275 So. 2d 496 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1973); Saturn Realty, Inc. v. Muller, 196 So. 2d 321 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967); Foulks v.
Richardson, 87 So. 2d 335 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1956); Howell v. Thompson, 38 So. 2d 167
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1949). In the following cases commissions were denied in situations
wherein the transaction was consummated after the expiration of a listing agreement
which did not contain an express extension clause, but wherein the court relied on the
fact, not that performance was belated, but that the broker was found not to be the
procuring cause of the transaction: Sleet v. Williams, 291 So. 2d 495 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1974); Doiron v. Reed, 25 So. 2d 630 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1946); Belvin v. Mansfield Hard-
wood Lumber Co., 1 So. 2d 804 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1941). Express extension clauses were
held inapplicable in the following cases because the court found the broker not to be
the procuring cause of the transaction: Bullis & Thomas v. Calvert 162 La. 378, 110 So.
621 (1926); Ford v. Shaffer, 143 La. 635, 79 So. 172 (1918); George E. Newell & Son v.
Terrytown New Orleans Corp., 193 So. 2d 389 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966); Doiron v. Reed,
25 So. 2d 630 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1946); Myevre v. Davila, 10 So. 2d 119 (La. App. Orl.
Cir. 1942).
167. Kirkland v. Bray, 241 So. 2d 601 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970) (the court will not in-
fer an implied extension clause where the broker was not the procuring cause).
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pires, the language of most express extension clauses affords
broader protection to the broker. Under the provisions of many ex-
press extension clauses, the broker need not prove that he was the
procuring cause of the eventual transaction; he need only show that
he "quoted"'6 9 the property to the eventual purchaser, or that the
ultimate purchaser was "interested in" or "introduced to" the prop-
erty by the broker"9 or that the broker "offered"'70 or "exhibited"''
or "submitted"'72 the property to the customer, or that the broker
"negotiated"'7 for the sale of the property. In these cases, if the
broker qualifies under the prerequisite language of the express ex-
tension clause, (e.g., as having quoted, offered, or submitted the
property), his right to a commission is absolutely protected should
the property be sold to that particular prospect, regardless of who
was the procuring cause.' However, while the broker is sometimes
relieved under an express extension clause from having to prove
that he was the procuring cause, the broker is always required to
prove that his active efforts on the principal's behalf were at least a
causal factor in the sale.'
It often seems that Louisiana courts are inconsistent in their en-
forcement of express extension clauses, sometimes placing lenient
interpretations upon them and sometimes giving them a strict con-
struction.'76 However, this seeming inconsistency is more apparent
168. See, e.g., Searcy v. Jacobs, 151 So. 2d 166, 169 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963)
("quote" means "to offer the property and state the price asked"); Coppage v. Camelo,
330 So. 2d 695 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976); Ruiz v. Kiehm's Pharmacy, 37 So. 2d 720 (La.
App. Orl. Cir. 1948).
169. See, e.g., Carter v. Hayes, 337 So. 2d 295 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976) (such interest
must lead directly to the sale; the mere fact that the broker in some way aided the
sale is not sufficient).
170. See, e.g., Langford v. Pioneer Land Co., 250 So. 2d 165 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1971).
171. See, e.g., Carey v. Humble, 212 So. 2d 439 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1968).
172. See, e.g., Harvey v. Sims, 198 So. 389 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1940).
173. See, e.g., Bullis & Thomas v. Calvert, 162 La. 378, 110 So. 621 (1926); Ruiz v.
Kiehm's Pharmacy, 37 So. 2d 720 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1948) ("negotiate" means more
than "quote").
174. See Carter v. Hayes, 337 So. 2d 295 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976). The Carter v.
Hayes court granted the commission to a broker who qualified under the language of
an express extension clause because he had "interested" the eventual purchaser in
buying the type of property which the vendor had for sale (ie., a rice farm) even
though the buyer, at the expiration of the primary term of the brokerage contract, had
not yet been told even the name of the vendor or the location or the price of the prop-
erty.
175. See Ruiz v. Kiehm's Pharmacy, 37 So. 2d 720 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1948) (commis-
sion denied where the property had been "quoted" by the owner and not by the
broker).
176. Compare Hamberlin v. Bourgeois, 289 So. 2d 358 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973), with
Carey v. Humble, 212 So. 2d 439 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1968).
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than real because, as is so often the case in fact-sensitive areas, the
rationale used by the court is heavily influenced by the desired
result. The operative factors relied on by the court in determining
which construction to use are not always overtly discussed, but it is
evident that the outcome is largely dependent upon the court's anal-
ysis of whether the broker was the procuring cause of a consum-
mated transaction and on the status of the negotiations at the time
of the expiration of the extension period, as well as on the extent to
which the broker's active efforts had contributed to success."7 If it
is established that the broker's negotiations were nearing the stage
of completion at the expiration of the brokerage contract, the court
may find that the principal, in bad faith, is trying to evade payment
of a commission by delaying the sale until the extension period
.ends.'8 The court may further protect the broker, if the purchaser is
related in some way to someone who was the broker's prospect, by
looking behind the identity of the nominal purchaser. The commis-
sion will be granted if the court finds that the "true" purchaser was
procured by the broker. 7'
Some listing agreements expressly specify that a commission
may be earned under an express extension clause if even a contract
to sell is executed during the extension period. 8° Even in cases
wherein an express extension clause requires a sale during the ex-
tension period in order to vest a commission right, if the broker is
found to be the procuring cause of the transaction, the court does
not require that the formal contract of sale be executed before the
expiration of the extension period.'8 ' To the contrary, in many cases
wherein the court has found the broker not to be the procuring
cause of the transaction, the court often relies, among other reasons,
on the fact that a sale was not consummated within the extension
period as a basis for denying recovery of a commission.'
177. See Hamberlin v. Bourgeois, 289 So. 2d 358 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973); Cruse v.
Brascato, 28 So. 2d 56 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1946).
178. See Treadway v. Lambert & Sarraxin, 96 So. 2d 115 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1957).
179. See, e.g., Garrick v. Rush, 275 So. 2d 496 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973) (commission
granted when the owner sold the property during the extension period to the son of
the broker's prospects. The broker had been the first to introduce the parents to the
property); Adair v. Fleming, 68 So. 2d 215 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1953); Ruiz v. Treadaway,
17 So. 2d 378 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1944) (commission granted to broker who "quoted" the
property to the mother and aunt of the ultimate purchaser).
180. See, e.g., Curuso-Goll v. LA NASA, 72 So. 2d 13 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1954); Zoll-
inger v. Gust, 192 So. 132 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1939).
181. See Hamberlin v. Bourgeois, 289 So. 2d 358 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973).
182. See, e.g., Langford v. Pioneer Land Co., 250 So. 2d 165 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971)
(although the broker had "offered" the property to the ultimate purchaser during the
primary term of the brokerage contract, a commission was denied under the express
extension clause because the sale had been completed outside the extension period and
19811
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
The express extension clause of many listing agreements pro-
vides an express exception, ie., that the extension clause does not
apply if the property is listed exclusively with another broker. How-
ever, even without an express provision for such an exception, the
extension clause has been held to protect brokers only when the
subsequent sale is completed directly through the principal himself,
as opposed to consummation through a second broker. "
Frequently, listing agreements require the principal to refer all
prospects to the broker during the term of the listing. Such clauses
prevent the principal from interfering in any way with the broker's
solicitation of prospects. 8' Louisiana courts have indicated a will-
ingness to enthusiastically enforce such clauses. " ' Non-interference
clauses have their greatest impact in extension clause disputes.
If the principal breaches a non-interference clause by neglecting
to refer to a prospect to the broker, the broker may, upon a subse-
quent sale of the property to that prospect, claim a commission on
the ground that the principal's breach substitutes for the broker's
performance under an extension clause. " Unless the broker had
because the sale was a result of a new and independent set of negotiations that had
begun after the original negotiations were discontinued); Carey v. Humble, 212 So. 2d
439 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1968) (same; although the broker had "exhibited" the property to
the eventual purchaser as required by the extension clause provision, commission was
denied because the sale had occurred outside the extension period. The court found
that there the original negotiations had failed and that the sale was a result of new
and independent negotiations).
183. See Cramer v. Guercio, 331 So. 2d 550 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976) (the court inter-
preted an extension clause which provided for a commission to be paid to the broker
"in the event of a sale by me/us within 6 months of expiration of listing" as being not
applicable to a sale through a second broker. The court was impressed by expert
testimony on this point, ie., that the custom in the business was to protect brokers
against the bad faith of the owner-principal only.) Older cases had held that if a prin-
cipal executed an exclusive listing with a second broker on property on which an ex-
tension clause applied in favor of a previous broker, the principal could be held liable
for two commissions. See, e.g., Englemann v. Auderer, 121 So. 194 (La. App. Orl. Cir.
1929).
184. Such clauses are hereinafter referred to as "non-interference clauses."
185. See Harvey v. Riedlinger, 17 So. 2d 60 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1944) (commission
granted under an express extension clause when the principal had breached his obliga-
tion to refer all prospects to the broker, despite the fact that the broker would not
otherwise have qualified under the language of the extension clause because he had
not "submitted" the property).
186. See, e.g., Coppage v, Woodward, 105 So. 2d 306 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1958) (com-
mission granted under an express extension clause. Although the court found that, in
.this particular case, the broker actually was the procuring cause of the transaction, the
court nevertheless stated, in dictum, that even if the broker had had no contacts with
the prospect during the primary term of the brokerage contract, the commission would
still be due as a result of the breach by the owner in not referring the prospects
(ultimate purchasers) to the broker).
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notice of the breach of the non-interference clause and nevertheless
declined to solicit the prospect's interest,'87 or unless the broker was
already aware of the prospect's existence,'88 it is presumed that the
broker could have accomplished any transaction which was ac-
complished by the owner.88 Thus, the principal's breach of a non-in-
terference clause may be a viable basis for a broker's commission
claim in cases wherein a sale has been made to a prospect whom the
principal was under a duty to refer to the broker.
Concept of Procuring Cause
Definition
As used in that branch of the law relating to brokers' commis-
sions, the terms "procuring cause," "efficient cause," and "prox-
imate cause" have substantially, if not quite, the same meaning
and are often used interchangeably, they refer to a cause origi-
nating or setting in motion a series of events which without
break in their continuity, result in the accomplishment of the
prime object of the employment of the broker, which may vari-
ously be a sale or exchange of the principal's property, an
ultimate agreement between the principal and a prospective con-
tracting party, or the procurement of a purchaser who is ready,
willing, and able to buy on the principal's terms.'
It has been held that the mere showing of property by a broker
does not, in and of itself, render the broker the procuring cause of a
187. See Acadian Inv. Co. v. Laird, 138 So. 2d 429, 432 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962) (com-
mission denied under an express extension clause where, although the owner had
violated the non-interference clause, the broker knew of the breach and even went to
see the prospect himself. But the broker failed to try to negotiate with the prospect
and in fact treated the brokerage contract as if it were terminated; therefore, "[tihe
reason for the rule failing, then the rule itself must fail, with the result that plaintiff
[broker] can not recover under the doctrine of the cases heretofore discussed").
188. See Latter & Blum, Inc. v. Grand Lodge of La., 357 So. 2d 1194 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1978) (commission denied because, although the owner did not refer a prospect to
the broker, the owner had not violated the non-interference clause because the broker
was already aware that the prospect had been interested in the principal's property,
and the owner did nothing to interfere with the broker's solicitation of the prospect).
189. See Doll v. Thornhill, 6 So. 2d 793 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1942) (it is no defense
that, even if the owner had complied and referred the prospect to the broker, no sale
would have taken place. The court did not accept the defendant's argument that the
difference between the maximum price the buyer would pay and the minimum price
the owner would accept did not include the amount of the broker's commission).
190. Sleet v. Harding, 383 So. 2d 122, 124 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980), quoting 12
C.J.S., Brokers § 91, at 208 (1938). Under the language of some express extension
clauses, a broker may recover a commission if he proves merely that his affirmative
actions were a contributing cause of the sale, whereas under the definition of "procur-
ing cause," a broker must show more than the mere fact that his actions in some way
aided the sale.
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subsequent transaction.' 9 ' Although a finding that a broker was the
procuring cause of a transaction requires proof of active efforts on
the broker's part,'92 it is possible for a court to find that a broker
was the procuring cause of a transaction solely upon a showing that
he advertised the principal's property when the advertisements first
interested the ultimate purchaser in the principal's property.'
The notion of procuring cause is a key element in many of the
compensation claims made by brokers. Directly or indirectly, the
answer to this crucial issue is decisive to the outcome of most
brokerage fee litigation. The concept of "procuring cause," however,
is a very evasive one, and a given fact situation may be susceptible
to conflicting opinions as to whether, under the circumstances, the
broker was the "procuring cause" of the transaction. 4 It is
therefore helpful to examine the most prominent factors that are
considered, overtly or covertly, by courts in making determinations
of procuring cause issues.
Relevant Factors
By analogy to the "but for" test used by courts in determining
proximate cause issues in tort cases,'95 the courts often look first to
see whether the prospect who ultimately purchased the property
knew about the property before being contacted by the broker.'96 In
fact, it is possible for a court to find that the broker was the procur-
ing cause of a transaction where he did nothing more than introduce
the prospect to the principal's property. 9 ' It should be noted,
191. Rosenblath v. Brumfield, 15 So. 2d 474 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1943).
192. Lehmann v. Howard, 49 So. 2d 453 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1950).
193. Sollie v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 194 So. 116 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1940).
194. See Dew v. Hunter, 66 So. 2d 400, 402 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1953): "Whether or
not a broker has procured a purchaser and his services are the proximate cause of a
sale is an issue of fact. In every such case the circumstances vary to the extent that
each case must be decided on its own particular factual situation."
195. See Comment, Proximate Cause in Louisiana, 16 LA. L. REV. 391 (1956).
196. In the following cases commissions were granted: Dickerson v. Hughes, 370
So. 2d 1301 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979) (broker was first to introduce prospect); Garrick v.
Rush, 275 So. 2d 496 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973) (broker was first to introduce the parents
of the ultimate purchaser to the property); Perkins & Sons v. Laborde, 271 So. 2d 658
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1972) (broker was first to introduce prospect); Ducournau v. Hen-
dricks, 159 So. 2d 736 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964) (same). But in the following cases commis-
sions were denied: Coppage v. Camelo, 330 So. 2d 695 (La. App. 4th Cr. 1976) (broker
was not the first to introduce prospect); Myevre v. Davila, 10 So. 2d 119 (La. App. Orl.
Cir. 1942) (same; prospect had seen the property advertised by owner in newspaper
and was merely by chance with the broker, looking over other properties, when he
mentioned to the broker that he would like to see the principal's property).
197. See Myevre v. Norton, 6 So. 2d 215, 217 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1942) (the broker
'sent the prospect over"; The brokers services were generally available, but the prin-
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however, that the fact that the broker was the first to introduce the
purchaser to the principal's property is only one of several signifi-
cant factors considered by courts. Therefore, it is possible for a
broker to be denied a commission in spite of the fact that he was the
first to introduce the prospect to the principal's property, if the
broker is nevertheless held not to be the procuring cause of the
transaction. '98
A more equivocal factor considered by the courts is the relative
success or failure of the negotiations conducted by the broker. A
broker generally is denied a commission if the sale of the principal's
property took place, not as a result of bargaining conducted by the
broker, but as a result of new and independent discussions between
the parties after the original negotiations had broken down.'99 Sub-
factors viewed by the court as indicative of success or failure of
negotiations may include the continuity or discontinuity of the
original and final negotiations,"'0 the length of time elapsing between
the broker's negotiations and the final sales agreement,0 ' and the
cipal carried on all negotiations himself. On the basis of a subsequent sale by the
owner to the prospect, the court granted recovery of a brokerage commission).
198. See, e.g., Freeman & Freeman v. Torre Realty & Improvement Co., 157 La.
1093, 103 So. 334 (1925) (the broker was the first to introduce the prospect to the prin-
cipal's property. The prospect originally rejected the broker's suggestions, refused to
make an offer, but finally concluded the sale through another broker; commission
denied. The court concluded that the broker's actions, although helpful, were not the
procuring cause of the sale); Ford v. Shaffer, 143 La. 635, 79 So. 172 (1918) (broker was
first to introduce the prospect, but the prospect was absolutely uninterested and refused
to negotiate. The owner subsequently sold directly to the prospect at a price greater
than the listed price; commission denied); Crasto v. Pohlman, 127 So. 89 (La. App. Orl.
Cir. 1930) (broker was the first to introduce the prospect, yet the broker never inform-
ed the principal of finding a prospect. The principal sold through another broker; com-
mission denied).
199.- See, e.g., Sleet v. Williams, 291 So. 2d 495 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974); Hamberlin
v. Bourgeois, 289 So. 2d 358 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973); Cobb v. Saucier, 30 So. 2d 784
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1947).
200. See George E. Newell & Son v. Terrytown New Orleans Corp., 193 So. 2d 389
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1966); Wittenberg v. McGrath, 3 La. App. 244 (Orl. Cir. 1925) (time
lapse of over 6 months; commission denied. The court stated that the new negotiations
which were initiated after the failure of the earlier negotiations "had nothing to do
with" the earlier attempt to sell).
201. See Coppage v. Camelo, 330 So. 2d 695 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976) (time lapse of 4
months; commission denied); Turner v. Swann, 124 So. 717 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1929) (one
year time lapse; commission denied); Shumake v. Gremillion, 4 La. App. 305 (2d Cir.
1926) (time lapse of 60 days; commission denied). See also Hamberlin v. Bourgeois, 289
So. 2d 358, 361 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973) (finding the broker to be the procuring cause of
the transaction and therefore granting him recovery of a commission, the court stated:
"This is not a case where the buyer had abandoned his intention to purchase and
become interested in the property again at a later date. Rather, we have here a con-
tinuous uninterrupted transaction"); Saturn Realty, Inc. v. Muller, 196 So. 2d 321 (La.
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development of a new, different, or independent motive for the pros-
pect to purchase.2 These sub-factors are not determinative in and
of themselves, but are merely used by the courts to ascertain
whether the broker's negotiations were successful. It is quite possi-
ble, in spite of a relatively short time lapse, for a court to find that
the broker's negotiations failed."3 Conversely, it is quite possible for
a court to find that, despite an apparent interruption or discontinu-
ity in the interchange between the parties, the eventual sale was a
result of the original negotiations. 4
Another important factor courts consider in deciding whether a
broker was the procuring cause of a transaction is whether or not
he abandoned efforts to negotiate the transaction with a particular
prospect.00 Still another factor, given great weight by courts in mak-
ing determinations of procuring cause issues, is the good or bad
faith of the principal and the broker. If a court finds the principal to
be in bad faith (ie., suspects that the principal is purposely trying to
evade payment of a commission rightfully due to the broker), a com-
App. 4th Cir. 1967) (small time lapse of only one week, so broker was the procuring
cause; commission granted).
202. See, e.g., Gamblin v. Young, 187 So. 854 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939). In Gamblin
the prospect initially was not interested in buying the subject property (a home under
construction) because his stay in Shreveport was for an indefinite length of time.
However, after the prospect's refusal to buy the house, his wife, watching the house
construction, eventually began to desire the house and finally talked her husband into
buying it directly through the owner. The court found that the broker was not the pro-
curing cause of the transaction.
203. See, e.g., Doiron v. Reed, 25 So. 2d 630 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1946) (despite an ex-
tremely short time lapse of just a few days, the court found that the original negotia-
tions conducted by the broker had failed, were abandoned, and that the subsequent
sale of the principal's property took place under new and independent negotiations;
commission denied).
204. See, e.g., Bennett v. Bobby J. Gauthier Contractor, Inc., 242 So. 2d 595 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1970) (court found the broker to be the procuring cause of the sale,
despite the fact that the buyer had torn up the purchase agreement negotiated by the
broker, when the buyer had eventually purchased on similar terms directly through
the owner; commission granted).
205. In the following cases the brokerage was denied: Munson v. Brouilette, 42 So.
2d 880, 881 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1949) (the broker "washed his hands of the deal");
Gamblin v. Young, 187 So. 854, 855 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1939) (after the broker learned
that his prospect had already committed himself to another lease, the broker "had no
further dealings with him"); Rosenthal v. Cangelosi, 164 So. 502, 504 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1935) (broker informed lessee that he was "through with the deal and had dropped it");
Fellman v. Ecuyer, 2 La. App. 398 (Orl. Cir. 1925) (broker had left the city for his vaca-
tion and did not even attempt to protect his commission). In the following cases the
brokerage commission was granted: Dickerson v. Hughes, 370 So. 2d 1301 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1979) (court found that broker had not abandoned the listing contract); Hamberlin
v. Bourgeois, 289 So. 2d 358 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973) (same).
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mission will be granted."' However, the mere fact that the principal
is in good faith does not necessarily warrant the conclusion that the
broker was not the procuring cause of the transaction."0 7 One mean-
ingful indicator of bad faith is the principal's awareness or know-
ledge that the customer was the broker's prospect."8 The knowledge
or awareness indicator becomes even more significant if coupled
with the possibility of prejudice to the principal (e.g., potential
liability on the part of the principal for more than one commission to
more than one broker),"9 or if the principal's unawareness was caused
by the negligence or bad faith of the broker. '
As discussed earlier,"' if the broker was the procuring cause of
a transaction, it is generally irrelevant that the consummation was
on terms and conditions less favorable than those stipulated in the
listing agreement or made at a price lower than the listed price, so
long as the principal consented to the modification in terms. In fact,
if the difference between the sale price and the listed price is exactly
206. See, e.g., Garrick v. Rush, 275 So. 2d 496 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973) (commission
granted where the court suspected collusion between the principal and the purchaser
to avoid payment of the brokerage commission); Howell v. Thompson, 38 So. 2d 167
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1949) (owner found to be in bad faith and so held liable for brokerage
commission); Wolf v. Casamento, 185 So. 537 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1939) (court found that
secret negotiations and collusion had taken place between the principal-owner and the
purchaser; commission granted).
207. See, e.g., Hamberlin v. Bourgeois, 289 So. 2d 358 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973) (com-
mission granted where the principal was not in bad faith); Saturn Realty, Inc. v.
Muller, 196 So. 2d 321 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967) (same).
208. In the following cases a commission was granted: Ducournau v. Hendricks, 159
So. 2d 736 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964) (principal-owners knew that the ultimate purchaser
had been introduced first by the broker); Jeter & Monroe v. Daniels, 25 So. 2d 911 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1946) (owner had knowledge of the fact that the broker had been
negotiating with the prospect); Wolf v. Casamento, 185 So. 537 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1939)
(same). In the following cases a commission was denied: Bullis & Thomas v. Calvert,
162 La. 378, 110 So. 621 (1926) (no knowledge on the part of the principal that the pur-
chaser was the broker's prospect); Freeman & Freeman v. Torre Realty & Improve-
ment Co., 157 La. 1093, 103 So. 334 (1925) (owner did not know that the broker,
through whom the final negotiations were completed, was not the same person as the
broker who had first introduced the prospect); Lewis v. Manson, 132 La. 817, 61 So.
835 (1913) (owner had no knowledge that the broker had any contact with the pur-
chaser's agent).
209. See, e.g., Crasto v. Pohlman, 127 So. 89 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1930) (commission
denied to original broker where the principal was unaware that the purchaser was the
original broker's prospect, and had already paid a brokerage commission to another
broker); Shumake v. Gremillion, 4 La. App. 305 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1926) (two brokers
both claiming commissions under the same brokerage contract from the same principal;
commission denied to the broker of whom the principal was unaware).
210. See, e.g., Harvey v. Aronson, 3 La. App. 751 (Orl. Cir. 1926) (broker had failed
to disclose the identity of his prospect to the principal).
211. See note 156, supra, and accompanying text.
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equal to the amount of commission the broker was to have earned,
this may be viewed as circumstancial evidence of bad faith on the
part of the principal and/or customer.' 2 However, in cases where the
eventual transaction took place on terms less favorable to the
customer (e.g., where the sale was consummated at a sale price
greater than the listed price), this circumstance is indicative that
the earlier negotiations had indeed failed; otherwise it is difficult to
see why the customer would not have transacted on the earlier,
more favorable terms.1 3
Similarly, when the broker is found to be the procuring cause of
a particular transaction, it is irrelevant that the sale was concluded
directly through the principal himself.214 Finally, in order to reach a
conclusion on a procuring cause issue, courts analyze all of the above
factors in the light of overriding considerations of fairness. 15
Failure of Customer or Principal to Consummate the Final
Transaction
Default of a Customer on a Contract to Sell
Where a principal hires a broker to sell his property, for the
seller to be liable for the brokerage commission, the broker must
procure a ready, willing, and able purchaser who executes a valid
and binding contract of sale with the principal. 1 ' If the customer
procured by the broker defaults on obligations under a contract to
212. See J. R. Grand Agency, Inc. v. Staring, 156 La. 1094, 101 So. 723 (1924); Gar-
rick v. Rush, 275 So. 2d 496 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973); Jeter & Monroe v. Daniels, 25 So.
2d 911 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1946).
213. See Ford v. Shaffer, 143 La. 635, 79 So. 172 (1918) (listed price of property was
$40.00 per acre, including the cattle. Broker was unable to advance negotiations be-
tween the prospect and the principal at that price, but the owner subsequently sold to
the same prospect for $37.50 per acre plus an additional sum for the cattle, which raised
the total sale price to over $40.00 per acre; the court found that the original negotia-
tions had failed, and the broker was denied a commission); Belvin v. Mansfield Hard-
wood Lumber Co., 1 So. 2d 804 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1941) (eventual sale took place 1-1/2
years later than the original negotiations and at a higher sale price; commission
denied).
214. Dickerson v. Hughes, 370 So. 2d 1301 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979); Slimer v. White,
275 So. 2d 468 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973); Dew v. Hunter, 66 So. 2d 400 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1953); White v. Havard, 25 So. 2d 108, 110 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1946) ("We are forced to
conclude that [the broker's) efforts were . . . the procuring cause of the sale . . .").
215. See, e.g., Bullis & Thomas v. Calvert, 162 La. 378, 383-84, 110 So. 621, 623
(1926) ("[The issue is whether] it would be unfair, and contrary to the intent of the par-
ties, that they [the brokers] should be deprived of the fruits of their labor by the mere
circumstance that the sale was not completed before the expiration of the extension
contemplated by the contract").
216. See note 102, supra, and accompanying text.
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sell or a purchase agreement, the broker may not claim a commis-
sion from the seller.217 Similarly, if the contemplated transaction was
to be an exchange which was not consummated as a result of a
defect in the title of the customer procured by the broker, the
broker has no claim for a commission against the principal.28 A
defaulting customer, however, may be liable for payment of the bro-
kerage commission under the express terms of the purchase agree-
ment, as a consequence of his nonperformance." 9 However, a decree
of specific performance rendered against a reluctant purchaser
relieves him of any liability for the brokerage commission based
upon his default.22 Whether or not the purchaser has defaulted is a
question of law to be decided by the court,22 ' but the issue of the
purchaser's default cannot be litigated collaterally in a suit by the
broker against the principal-owner for a brokerage commision; the
customer must be joined as a defendant in the litigation.222
217. See Boisseau v. Vallon & Jordano, Inc., 174 La. 492, 141 So. 38 (1932) (the
supreme court stated that it has long disfavored clauses that provide for payment of
brokerage fee upon acceptance); Puckett v. Broussard, 356 So. 2d 1021 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1977); Adams v. Adams, 283 So. 2d 503 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973); C. J. Tessier, Inc.
v. Wedderin, 59 So. 2d 219, 219 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1952) (court refused to hold
principal-seller liable for commission upon purchaser's default, despite express contrac-
tual language in the breached purchase agreement providing that "the commission is
earned upon the signing of this agreement"); McKelvy v. Milford, 37 So. 2d 370 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1948) (the court ignored express contractual language providing that the
commission was to be earned upon the mere signing of the purchase agreement and
held the seller not liable for the commission where the purchaser defaulted).
218. See Spiro v. Corpora, 174 So. 145 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1937).
219. See, e.g., Probst v. Digiovanna, 232 La. 811, 95 So. 2d 321 (1957) (defaulting
purchaser held liable for commission under express contractual provision requiring the
defaulting party to pay the brokerage commission); Wendel v. Dixon Real Estate Co.,
232 So. 2d 791 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970) (penalty provision imposing contingent liability
on a purchaser in the event of his default is not contrary to public policy and will be
given full effect); Dane & Northrop v. Seizer, 63 So. 2d 760 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1953)
(defaulting purchaser held liable for commission if contract to sell contained express
provision to that effect); Blache v. Goodier, 22 So. 2d 82 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1945) (court
awarded commission to broker, to be paid by the defaulting purchaser, as per default
provision of purchase agreement, despite the fact that the broker also earned another
commission on the same property from a different buyer).
220. Hunley v. Ascani, 174 La. 712, 141 So. 385 (1932).
221. See, e.g., Adams v. Spillman, 290 So. 2d 726 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974) (court
found that the proposed sale was "per aversionem" and therefore the purchaser had no
right to refuse to buy because of diminished acreage. Since the court found the pur-
chaser to be in default, the principal-seller was relieved of liability for payment of the
commission); Treadaway v. Piazza, 156 So. 2d 328 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963) (court held
that a condition in a contract to sell making the sale subject to the purchaser's obtain-
ing financing through a homestead loan constituted a suspensive condition, and,
therefore, when the purchaser in good faith was unsuccessful in obtaining the desired
loan, this did not constitute "default" on the purchaser's part).
222. Leaman v. Rauschkolb, 199 So. 663 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1941).
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As a corollary of the general rule that a broker has no right to a
commission unless he has procured a ready, willing, and able cus-
tomer who enters into a binding contract with the principal, the
well-established rule is that, since an earnest money contract is not
binding, a broker earns no commission rights for the execution of an
earnest money contract."3 Consequently, a broker is not entitled to
deduct a commission from forfeited earnest money. The same rule
applies to forfeited "deposits,"12 ie., the principal is entitled to the
whole of the forfeited deposit, to the exclusion of the broker. 5 In
fact, evep in cases wherein the purchase agreement contains ex-
press language granting the broker a right to retain his commission
from a forfeited simple deposit, the courts sometimes have ignored
this language and have refused to enforce it.
226
There may be some exceptions when the broker would have the
right to retain his commission out of a forfeited deposit. For in-
stance, if the principal voluntarily released the purchaser, thus pre-
judicing the broker's rights, the broker may be able to claim a com-
mission out of any sums retained by the principal."7 In addition, if
the principal manifested an absolute intent to pay a commission "in
any event," the broker may have rights to a forfeited deposit. 8
Also, it appears that if the purchase agreement provides for a
double penalty, half of which is kept by the principal and half of
which goes to the broker as his fee, this clause will be enforced." It
223. Bruno v. Serio, 50 So. 2d 78 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1951).
224. Note that courts treat "deposits" as earnest money unless expressly
stipulated otherwise or unless the parties expressly reserve the right to specific per-
formance. Haeuser v. Schiro, 235 La. 909, 106 So. 2d 306 (1958).
225. 12 AM. JuR. 2d Brokers § 210 (1964), citing Southport Mill v. Friedrichs, 171
La. 786, 132 So. 346 (1931); Bruno v. Serio, 50 So. 2d 78 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1951); Net-
tles v. Vignes, 49 So. 2d 371 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1950).
226. See Bruno v. Serio, 50 So. 2d 78 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1951). Despite contractual
language giving the broker the right to retain his commission out of a forfeited simple
deposit, the Bruno court concluded that the broker had no interest in the forfeited
deposit. The court distinguished Jourdan v. Jones, 33 So. 2d 416 (La. App. Orl. Cir.
1948), which enforced a similar contractual provision, saying that in Jourdan, the
owner voluntarily acknowledged the broker's right to retain the commission, whereas
in the instant case this issue was in contest. See Nettles v. Vignes, 49 So. 2d 371 (La.
App. Orl. Cir. 1950).
227. Boone v. David, 52 So. 2d 563 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1951) (owners voluntarily
released the purchaser and were thus held liable for payment of the brokerage com-
mission).
228. Maloney v. Aschaffenburg, 143 La. 509, 78 So. 761 (1917).
229. Wendel v. Dixon Real Estate Co., 232 So. 2d 791 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970). The
Wendel court enforced the following contractual provision giving the broker a right to
retain a commission out of a forfeited double penalty. "In the event the purchaser fails
to comply with this agreement within the time specified, the seller shall have the right
to demand the deposit plus an equal amount as penalty less the agent's commission."
Id. at 794 (emphasis added).
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should be noted that, at common law, the parties are completely free
to stipulate as to the disposition of a forfeited sum, and common law
courts apparently are more willing to uphold and enforce any provi-
sion agreed to by the parties-even with respect to forfeiture of
simple deposits. 30
Default of the Principal
When a property owner hires a broker to sell his property, he
makes two promises to the broker. The first is an implied promise
that the principal will willingly sell his property to any ready, will-
ing, and able customer procured by the broker.23' Of course, this
obligation to sell becomes absolute only if and when the broker does
in fact procure such a purchaser. The second promise is the prin-
cipal's express promise to pay the brokerage commission, which
becomes absolute when the sale has been consummated. These two
promises exist independently of one another. As a general rule, in
cases in which the brokerage agreement contains no term, the
owner will not be held liable for payment of a brokerage commission
if he changes his mind and takes his property off the market before
the broker has procured a ready, willing, and able customer. Even
when the brokerage contract provides that the listing must remain
open for a specified time, if the principal breaches by wrongfully
terminating the listing before it expires, the result usually will be
the same. Since incidental expenses incurred by the broker usually
are not recoverable, in order to obtain damages, a broker ordinarily
must show that he has been deprived of his right to collect an earned
commission, i.e., that the broker had procured a qualified customer
at the time of the principal's breach. 32 However, in brokerage con-
230. See Annot., Real Estate Broker's Right to Commission as Affected by Failure
or Refusal of Customer (Prospect) to Comply with Valid Contract, 74 A.L.R.2d 468
(1960); 12 AM. JR. 2d Brokers §§ 209-10 (1964):
The right of the broker to a commission where the down payment or earnest
money has been forfeited may be controlled by an agreement between the broker
and his principal for the division between them of the forfeited money .... [Tihe
relative rights of a broker and his vendor to a down payment or earnest money
forfeited to the vendee for the latter's default under a real estate contract depend
generally upon the terms and provisions of the particular contract.
231. See Comment, The Implication of a Promise to Buy or Sell into a Real Estate
Brokerage Contract: An Analysis of the Ready, Willing and Able Theory, 114 U. PA.
L. REV. 380 (1966).
232. Stevens v. Tynes, 357 So. 2d 7 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978). Despite the fact that
the principal wrongfully revoked the broker's authority to sell prior to the expiration
of the listing agreement, the Stevens court refused to hold the principal liable for pay-
ment of the brokerage commission. The court cited Civil Code article 2040 ("The condi-
tion is considered as fulfilled, when the fulfillment of it has been prevented by the party
bound to perform it"), but interpreted that article to mean that the broker must prove
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tracts which contemplate extremely large advertising expenditures,
the courts might be persuaded to award damages other than loss of
commission, if the equities are compelling enough to convince the
court to deviate from the normal rule. Of course, once the broker
has succeeded in procuring a ready, willing, and able customer, the
principal no longer may change his mind about selling his property;
once the principal's implied promise has become absolute, he no
longer may refuse to accept the prospect or refuse to contract with
him.233 If the principal then changes his mind, refuses to accept a
ready, willing, and able customer procured by the broker, or refuses
to complete the transaction, the principal may be liable for the
brokerage commission as a result of the breach of his implied obliga-
tion under the listing agreement.23 '
Analytical problems arise, however, in cases wherein the owner
has hired a broker on the condition that the commission will be paid
by the customer or in those cases in which a prospective purchaser
has hired a broker, requiring him to seek remuneration from the
seller. In these situations, where the broker has successfully pro-
cured a ready, willing, and able customer only to have the principal
that, but for the principal's wrongful revocation, the broker would have succeeded in
procuring a ready, willing, and able customer on terms conformable to those stipulated
in the listing agreement. However, if the contract is one which would be characterized
at common law as bilateral, the principal's offer to list the property, once accepted by
the broker, may be regarded as absolutely irrevocable. See Comment, Real Estate
Brokerage in Louisiana, 17 LA. L. REV. 820 (1957). However, under the common law
theory of bilateral contracts, there must be some consideration given on both sides. It
is generally considered that mere permission from the principal for the broker to sell
property does not constitute a bilateral agreement absent some consideration or ex-
penditures on the part of the broker. See Annot., Broker's Right to Commission on
Sales Consummated After Termination of Employment, 27 A.L.R.2d 1348 (1953).
233. Williams v. Cormier, 100 So. 2d 307 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1958) (principal held
liable for commission where he voluntarily released the purchaser and prevented the
consummation of the sale by selling to a third person); Boone v. David, 52 So. 2d 563
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1951) (principal held liable for commission where he voluntarily
released purchaser without obtaining broker's consent); Spiro v. Corpora, 174 So. 145
(La. App. Orl. Cir. 1937); Ernest A. Carrere's Sons v. Edstrom, 119 So. 284 (La. App.
Orl. Cir. 1928) (holding the principal-lessor liable for payment of the brokerage commis-
sion). The Edstrom court stated that it was apparent that the principal-lessor simply
changed her mind, ie., refused to go forward with the transaction once the broker had
succeeded in procuring a ready, willing, and able tenant on the listed terms.
For what reason we are not informed, nor is it important for the determination
of the issues presented by this case. She had a perfect right to recede from the
contract at any time prior to its formal execution, as was provided in the agree-
ment to lease the property, but the exercise of that privilege was burdened with
the responsibility for the compensation earned by the plaintiff, in her service.
Id. at 285 (emphasis added).
234. The defaulting principal remains liable for payment of the brokerage commis-
sion regardless of whether the broker returned the purchaser's deposit after the prin-
cipal's breach. Wolfe v. Anderson, 242 So. 2d 14 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
[Vol. 41
COMMENT
(who never promised to pay a commission) default, the broker is
unable to sue the party who did promise to pay the commission-
the customer-and must therefore seek relief via a suit against the
defaulting purchaser for-damages measured by the amount of the
lost commission. Since the principal in such cases never expressly
promised to pay the commission, such a suit must be based on the
principal's implied promise to accept a ready, willing, and able cus-
tomer procured by the broker and to perform the contract."'5 Under
the above analysis, the principal's breach of his implied promise to
buy or sell is actionable regardless of who has promised to pay the
contractual commission.
An exception to the rule that the seller is liable for payment of
the brokerage commission if he wrongfully refuses to accept a
ready, willing, and able prospect or otherwise prevents the consum-
mation of the transaction is found in cases wherein the broker him-
self consents to or acquiesces in the principal's change of mind. 3 '
The general rule applies if the principal voluntarily releases the pur-
chaser from his obligation to perform on a contract to sell or if the
principal and the customer mutually agree to rescind their agree-
ment. In some cases, the principal may unequivocally reserve his
right to refuse to consummate the sale; but Louisiana courts usually
find that this was not the intent of the parties, that the principal did
not retain the right to refuse to deal, and thus that the principal will
be liable for payment of the commission if he has prevented the con-
summation of the contemplated transaction.3 '
The principal's nonperformance may be excused, thus relieving
him of liability under a brokerage contract, when the nonperform-
ance was caused by a fortuitous event which was not the fault of the
principal."3 Still another exception to the general rule, recognized at
235. See Comment, supra note 231.
236. See, e.g., Erwin v. Yockey, 329 So. 2d 890 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976) (commission
denied on the ground that the broker had acquiesced in the owner's removal of the
house from the market); Miller v. Riley, 152 So. 2d 852 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963) (com-
mission denied to the broker where the vendor, with the knowledge, concurrence, and
assistance of the realtor, released the purchaser from his contract to sell).
237. See Neal v. Murff, 133 So. 418 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1931). But see Westinghouse
Credit Corp. v. Cassano, 291 So. 2d 493 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974). In Cassano the owner
expressly and unequivocally reserved the right to approve each sale. Some sales he
disapproved for no other reason than that they were cash sales, whereas he desired
credit purchasers so as to earn interest. The court upheld his right to refuse cash pur-
chasers (although otherwise ready, willing, and able customers) under the rationale
that this was not an arbitrary and capricious refusal to sell.
238. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2219: "When the ... substance, which was the object of the
obligation, is destroyed, is rendered unsalable, or is lost so that it is absolutely known
not to exist the obligation is extinguished .. " See Williams v. Bel, 339 So. 2d 748 (La.
1976) (flood-damaged property was rendered unsalable; thus, no commission earned).
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common law, may be found in cases wherein the principal's nonper-
formance is legally excused on the grounds of incapacity,"9 or when
the principal's refusal to perform is justified by acts of fraud, mis-
representation or other misconduct on the part of the customer." '
Where the vendor and vendee are both at fault, both share equal
responsibility for payment of the brokerage commission4
Defects in the Title of the Principal
Although a principal may be liable for payment of a brokerage
commission when a defect in his title prevents consummation of the
transaction, nevertheless, it appears that the principal's inability to
perform on these grounds is not viewed technically as "fault" on his
part.2"2 In the absence of a contractual provision to the contrary, the
broker is entitled to his commissions if, acting in good faith, he pro-
cures a customer willing, able, and ready to take the property upon
the terms offered by the principal, although the contract is rescinded
or the -sale otherwise fails because of a defect in the principal's title
of which the broker had no notice.43 The rationale for this rule is
239. See Smith v. Blum, 143 So. 2d 419 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962). In Smith v. Blum,
the vendor, refusing to perform, defended the broker's suit for commission on the
basis of his alleged contractual incapacity (ie., incompetency). However, the court held
the principal liable for the commission, finding that the alleged indications of senility
were not apparent to the broker at the time of the execution of the contract to sell and
that any incapacity of the principal was not known to the broker at the relevant times;
ergo the contract to sell was valid and, since the principal had refused to perform, he
was liable for payment of the brokerage commission.
240. See Annot., Broker's Right to Commission on Sale Rejected by Principal
Because of Buyer's Fraud or Misrepresentation, 79 A.L.R.2d 1055 (1961).
241. Treigle v. Patrick, 138 So. 2d 652 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
242. See Annot., Failure of Title as Fault or Default of Owner Within Exception
in Contractual Provision Denying Broker's Right to Commissions if Sale is Not Closed,
56 A.L.R. 913 (1928).
243. Castellon v. Nations, 230 So. 2d 675 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970) (principal's title
was defective; therefore he was liable for payment of the brokerage commission);
Strahan v. Weiland, 216 So. 2d 169 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968) (the principal-seller had
minor children who owned a one-half undivided interest in the property, and their
undertutor refused to consent to the sale, which was therefore not consummated. Find-
ing that the broker had no actual knowledge of the fact that the principal did not have
clear title, the court held the principal liable for payment of the commission);
Schroeder v. Krushevski, 186 So. 2d 640 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966) (conditional contract
to sell became unconditional when the savings and loan association approved a loan for
the purchaser. The sale was not consummated due to a defect in the principal's title;
the principal was held liable for payment of the brokerage commission); Walker v.
Moore, 68 So. 2d 222, 222 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1953) (ignoring express contractual
language that stipulated, "when the deed is signed, I will . . . pay [the commissionj"
the court held the principal liable for the brokerage fee where the sale was not con-
summated due to a defect in the principal's title); Cotter v. Figaro, 36 So. 2d 291 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1948) (principal's title defect resulted in non-consummation of the sale;
principal was held liable for payment of the commission).
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that, in the absence of notice to the contrary, a broker has a right to
rely on the assumption that his principal's title is valid and
marketable. '
Extensive jurisprudence treats the issue of what defects in a
principal's title will render him liable for payment of a brokerage
commission. The widely recognized rule is that if a principal's title is
marketable at the moment of the execution of a contract to sell (ie.,
purchase agreement) and only subsequently becomes unmarketable
through no fault of the principal, the principal will not be liable for
payment of a commission.4 5 A principal's defective title, to render
him liable for a brokerage commission despite non-consummation of
the intended transaction, must be serious enough to render the title
"unmerchantable" by legal standards. 4
The jurisprudence, in other words, does not require that the
principal's title be perfect."' Defective, unmerchantable titles have
been held to include those clouded by adverse tax titles, 8 en-
croachments,249 outstanding encumbrances, 0 adverse mineral in-
terests,25 ' competitive co-ownership or community interests,252 poten-
tial legitime disputes (i e., all ownership obtained through donations
244. Cox v. Green, 70 So. 2d 724 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1954).
245. See, e.g., Dutel v. Bitterwolf, 166 So. 2d 526 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964); Cabral v.
Barkerding, 50 So. 2d 516 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1951); Neal v. Halliburton, 19 So. 2d 625
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1944).
246. Spiro v. Corpora, 174 So. 145 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1937). Generally, the opinion
of a competent attorney as to whether or not a given title is "marketable" will be cor-
rect. But see Clesi, Inc. v. Quaglino, 137 So. 2d 500 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962) (court
stated that the approval or disapproval of a title by an attorney or lending agency
does not, in itself, render the title conclusively merchantable or unmerchantable. This
is an issue for the court to determine. Since no court should entertain testimony by ex-
pert witnesses on issues of domestic law, no expert witness may testify as to the mer-
chantability vel non of the principal's title. The court held the principal liable for pay-
ment of the commission, despite the fact that his attorney opined his title to be good).
247. See Ibeck v. Wise-Miller, 174 La. 1012, 142 So. 155 (1932) ("merchantable" does
not connote a "perfect" title. Court held that the principal's title was merchantable,
despite the fact that it contained minor, correctable defects; principal held not liable
for payment of the commission); Spiro v. Corpora, 174 So. 145 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1937)
(purchaser refused to accept property the ownership of which was listed in the wife's
name. The court held that this situation alone, in the absence of evidence that the hus-
band intended to refuse his consent to the sale, did not render the wife's title unmer-
chantable).
248. See, e.g., Pierre v. Chevalier, 233 So. 2d 61 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
249. See Pierre v. Chevalier, 233 So. 2d 61 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
250. See Webb v. Gee, 128 So. 2d 449 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961) (by implication).
251. See, e.g., Treadaway v. Amundson, 88 So. 2d 67 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1956).
252. See, e.g., Matthews Bros. v. Bernius, 169 La. 1069, 126 So. 556 (1930) (principal
could not perform because the subject property was community property, and the prin-
cipal's spouse refused to consent to the sale; principal held liable for payment of the
commission).
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are per se unmerchantable),52 and outstanding leases."4 It is im-
material that the contemplated transaction is an exchange rather
than a sale; the principal will be held liable for a commission in
either case if his title is defective. 55
There are at least five general exceptions to the rule that a
principal may be liable for a commission where non-consummation is
due to a defect in his title.
First, although the broker generally has the right to rely on the
assumption that the principal's title is valid and marketable, if the
broker has actual knowledge or notice of the defect in the principal's
title, his right to a commission will be denied.256 At common law, a
broker's awareness of the fact that the owner is only a joint or par-
tial owner in the subject property or that the signature of a spouse,
partner, or corporation will be required in order to sell the property
does not constitute actual knowledge of a defective title unless the
broker also had notice that the co-owner, spouse, or partner did not
intend to consent.5 7 In Louisiana, however, if the broker knows that
the principal does not have a complete title, but is merely a co-
253. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1504 & 1515; Cox v. Green 70 So. 2d 724 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1954) (consummation prevented because the principal obtained her title through a
donation and therefore her title was defective; principal held liable for payment of the
commission).
254. See, e.g., Stoer v. Pearson, 5 La. App. 609 (lst Cir. 1927).
255. One earlier case used overbroad dicta which implied that if either the ex-
changor's title or the exchangee's title was invalid, no commission would be due.
Boisseau v. Vallon & Jordano, Inc., 174 La. 492, 141 So. 38 (1932). In Boisseau, the
court denied recovery of a commission under circumstances where a contemplated ex-
change could not be consummated because of a defect in the customer's title. However,
the court (erroneously) rationalized, "[the principal] most assuredly, if he were sane....
did not intend to pay the commissions if the title to either his lots or the property [of
the customer] was defective .. " (Emphasis added). 174 La. at 501, 141 So. at 41. A
significant later case, however, has questioned and clarified that dicta. See Guy L.
Deano, Inc. v. Michel, 181 So. 551 (La. App. Orl. Cir.), annulled on other grounds, 191
La. 233, 185 So. 9 (1938):
We cannot but feel that the reference [in Boisseaul to "his lots" was inadvertently
placed in the opinion. If that statement was intentionally and deliberately made,
then the effect of the decision would be to overrule the long line of cases which
have firmly established the doctrine that "when the broker produces a purchaser
he is entitled to his commission although a sale is not consummated because of
the inability of the vendor to comply with his offer .... [W]e see no reason why...
either party should not be liable [for a commission if] the transaction fails because
of a defect in [the principal's] own title, and we respectfully conclude that that is
all the Supreme Court intended to say in the Boisseau case.
181 So. at 554.
256. Caruso-Goll v. D'Alfonso, 1 So. 2d 120 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1941).
257. See Annot., Kowledge, Actual or Imputable, of Default or Condition Prevent-
ing Consummation of Sale as Affecting Realestate Broker's Rights to Commissions,
156 A.L.R. 1398 (1945).
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owner in indivision of property, the right to a commission will be
denied.25
Although the courts require evidence that the broker had actual
knowledge or notice, as opposed to constructive knowledge or
notice,259 the broker's claim can be barred as a result of imputed
knowledge when the broker has actual notice of facts that would
signal the presence of a title defect to the average, reasonably pru-
dent person. 6'
Second, if the contract to sell is only a conditional one, and the
condition is never fulfilled to create a binding contract, a brokerage
commission is not earned, regardless of the status of the principal's
title. '
Third, Louisiana courts will not hold a principal liable for pay-
ment of a brokerage commission- regardless of a defect in the prin-
258. Werner, McShan & Robertson, Inc. v. Bonnette, 160 So. 2d 334 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1964) (broker had actual notice that the principal had only a co-ownership interest
in the property; commission denied). See Farrier v. Guillory, 342 So. 2d 1167 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1977). In Farrier the court granted recovery of a commission to a broker
despite the fact that the broker knew that the owners might not have title in
themselves, but where the broker reasonably believed that they either were or soon
would be the legal owners of the property. Anticipatory conveyances are valid in Loui-
siana. Friedman Iron & Supply Co. v. J. B. Beaird Co., 222 La. 627, 63 So. 2d 144
(1953).
259. See Cox v. Green, 70 So. 2d 724 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1954) (broker is not re-
quired to investigate the records of the conveyance office).
260. See Cox v. Green, 70 So. 2d 724 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1954). Cox contains dicta in-
dicating that if a broker has actual knowledge that the principal has only a life estate
in the property, the court will impute to the broker an understanding of the legal
significance of the fact that the principal did not have a fee interest. Similarly, Loui-
siana brokers are presumed to be aware of the legal disabilities associated with co-
ownership of property. Werner, McShan & Robertson, Inc. v. Bonnette, 160 So. 2d 334
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1964). However, Louisiana brokers are not charged with the
knowledge of the legal effects of a donation under Civil Code articles 1504 and 1505.
Cox v. Green, 70 So. 2d 724 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1954). Thus, the mere fact that a broker
has been told that the principal obtained his property by donation is not sufficient to
defeat the broker's claim for a commission when the sale is not consummated as a
result of the defective title. "The [broker] under the jurisprudence [is] not ... required
to investigate the records of the conveyance office, [and is] equally relieved of any
legal obligation or duty to employ an attorney for the purpose of giving him a legal
opinion as to defendant's title or specifically as to the status of a donation." I& at 727.
261. Jacobs v. Grasshoff, 120 So. 417 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1929) (a binding contract is
required to vest the broker's right to a commission; thus, when the contract to sell was
conditional, no commission is due regardless of the defect in the principal's title). See
Schroeder v. Krushevski, 186 So. 2d 640 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966) (after a conditional
contract to sell has been made binding by the fulfillment of the condition, if non-
consummation is caused by a defect in the principal's title, the principal is liable for
payment of a commission).
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cipal's title-if the purchaser never required or demanded that the
principal perform. 82
Fourth, the general rule (ie., that a principal may be held liable
for payment of a brokerage commission if non-consummation of the
contemplated transaction is the result of a defect in the principal's
title) is applied only in the absence of express contractual language
to the contrary. 3 Many modern purchase agreements used by
brokers provide that the seller's inability to deliver a merchantable
title within the time stipulated shall render the contract null and
void."8'
Finally, the principal may be relieved from liability for payment
of a brokerage commission in cases wherein the broker violated his
overriding fiduciary duty of good faith toward the principal. There
is one significant Louisiana case in which the court, by engaging in a
tortuous construction of a brokerage agreement, relieved a principal
who had a defective title of liability for a brokerage commission
because the broker had acted in bad faith toward his principal.26
Lora C. Sykora
262. Wells v. Spears, 255 So. 2d 215 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971). In Wells the purchase
agreement provided that the principal had 30 days to correct any defects in his title,
but the purchaser never' notified the principal that his title contained any defects. The
court held the principal not liable for payment of the commission. It is submitted that
the outcome of this case is questionable, since the broker was denied any commission
at all, in spite of the fact that one of the parties was clearly at fault. The principal in
this case could have demanded performance on the part of the purchaser, together
with a 30-day extension to correct any defects in his title. This he did not do. If the
purchaser refused to demand conveyance of a marketable title, then the purchaser
would be in (passive) default and could be held liable for payment of the commission.
However, as was probably the case, if the purchaser stood ready to purchase a
marketable title from the principal, but the principal was unable to convey one, then
the principal should be liable for the commission. In neither case should the broker
have been denied his commission. But see Leaman v. Rauschkolb, 199 So. 663 (La. App.
Orl. Cir. 1941). The purchaser in Leaman refused to consummate the sale because his
attorney told him that the seller-principal's title was defective, and the principal-seller
insisted that his title was good, yet never sued the buyer for specific performance
(never tendered a good title); the court held that it would presume that the principal's
title was defective and found the principal liable for payment of the commission.
263. See Kuhn v. Stan A. Plauche Real Estate Co., 249 La. 85, 185 So. 2d 210
(1966); Note, Contracts-Broker's Commission, 13 Loy. L. REV. 159 (1967).
264. See, e.g., Johnston v. Cole, 163 La. 885, 113 So. 135 (1927). The Johnston court
held that the general rules regarding defective titles of principals did not apply in
light of the special contractual provision in the principal's listing agreement that the
broker was entitled to no commission unless a sale was consummated and the purchase
price paid in full.
265. Oldham v. Jones, 136 So. 2d 310 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961). The Oldham. ma-
jority upheld the following express contractual language found in the purchase agree-
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ment: "In the event Title cannot be made valid and merchantable within 60 days from
date, the money receipted for shall be returned and buyer and seller will be relieved of
any obligation under this contract." Id. at 311 (emphasis added). The court stated:
"[T]itle was not perfected ... within the [time) . . . provided for . . . Under these cir-
cumstances, the contract came to an end and both parties were released from any
obligations thereunder by its very terms." Id. at 312.

